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NAVIGATING 21ST CENTURY TAX JURISDICTION 
HAYES R. HOLDERNESS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Hailed as a massive victory for the states, the Supreme Court’s 
2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. brought dated state 
tax jurisdiction standards into the twenty-first century, freeing the 
states to tax internet vendors.  However, the decision left the larger 
state tax jurisdiction doctrine undertheorized and at a crossroads: 
Should the doctrine concern itself only with notice and fairness is-
sues akin to those found in the due process personal jurisdiction 
realm, or should it also concern itself with protecting interstate 
commerce from undue state tax burdens? 
 This Article will argue for the latter path by developing a robust 
theory of state tax jurisdiction that focuses on the potential undue 
burdens of tax compliance costs, burdens a threshold jurisdictional 
standard is uniquely able to address.  From this compliance bur-
den theory emerges a jurisdictional standard which would protect 
interstate commerce—particularly the activities of small busi-
nesses and entities that facilitate the commerce of others, such as 
online marketplaces, payment intermediaries, and common carri-
ers—from the chilling effects of heavy state tax compliance costs.  
This Article will conclude by demonstrating how unanswered ques-
tions from Wayfair provide opportunities to incorporate the pro-
posed standard into the state tax jurisdiction doctrine, detailing the 
way forward from Wayfair. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“So how many sales does it take?” Justice Sotomayor asked during oral 
arguments for South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,1 the landmark 2018 decision in 
which the Supreme Court reconsidered decades of doctrine regarding state 
tax power.2  Justice Sotomayor was trying to discern when an out-of-state 
vendor would have a constitutionally-sufficient connection with a state such 
that the state could tax the vendor.  The South Dakota Attorney General’s 
answer?  “[O]ne sale.”3  Internet vendors and small businesses shuddered;4 
South Dakota’s position could have exposed them to a wealth of new state 
tax obligations. 
For its part, the Wayfair majority skirted Justice Sotomayor’s question 
and instead concluded that the constitutionally-sufficient connection—
termed “nexus”5—exists when the taxpayer6 purposefully “‘avails itself of 
the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.”7  Stu-
dents of due process personal jurisdiction doctrine perked up, but their ex-
citement should be tempered.  The Wayfair Court was articulating a nexus 
standard imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause, not the Due Process 
Clause,8 and the state tax jurisprudence has recognized that the two clauses 
address different concerns.9  The Due Process Clause is concerned with fun-
damental notions of fairness and with providing taxpayers notice of state tax 
                                                        
 1.  138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 2.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) 
(No. 17-494). 
 3.  Id. at 6.  
 4.  Justice Breyer has expressed concerns about state jurisdiction over small sellers a number 
of times, invoking the examples of a small mandolin seller and an Appalachian potter.  See J. McIn-
tyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring); Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 36–37. 
 5.  See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power, and Policy, 55 
ST. TAX NOTES 555, 555 (2010). 
 6.  For ease of discussion, this Article will refer to a person on whom a state is attempting to 
place an obligation either to collect or to pay a tax as a “taxpayer.”  The Supreme Court has applied 
the same jurisdictional rules to both tax collectors and taxpayers in the case law.  See Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“As an original matter, it might 
have been possible to distinguish between jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction to compel collection 
of taxes as agent for the State, but we have rejected that.”). 
 7.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 
(2009)). 
 8.  For ease of discussion, the Article refers to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Due Process Clause.  Likewise, references to due process concerns address con-
cerns arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not that of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 9.  See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305 (“[T]he Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers 
of the States.  Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the 
authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
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power over them; the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with protect-
ing against the “economic Balkanization” of the states.10 
The Wayfair majority’s due-process-esque dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard is symptomatic of one of the state tax jurisprudence’s core 
problems: The nexus concept is complicated and confusing.  This confusion 
manifests throughout the development of the case law, which has led to a 
complicated array of nexus requirements.  There is a due process nexus re-
quirement that appears to track the due process personal jurisdiction require-
ment,11 and there is a dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement that bi-
furcates into requiring both a state connection with the taxpayer and a state 
connection with the activity taxed.12  Adding further to the complexity, the 
standards for both aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus require-
ment have been undertheorized and underdeveloped in the case law, leading 
to decisions turning on conclusory statements about when the standards are 
satisfied.  This Article will tackle these problems in order to provide coher-
ence to the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. 
Not to sell the decision short, Wayfair did provide some measure of co-
herence to the doctrine by scraping a questionable, but longstanding, dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus standard requiring a taxpayer’s physical presence 
in the taxing state.  This physical presence rule had prevented the states from 
requiring internet vendors like Amazon.com to collect their sales taxes, 
which was a major source of frustration for the states.13  Despite bringing the 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard into the twenty-first century, 
Wayfair did little to address larger confusions over the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus requirement.  In particular, the opinion passed up opportunities 
to give meaning to its nexus standard and to better explain the relationship 
between the due process nexus requirement and the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus requirement.14  In short, Wayfair left the dormant Commerce 
                                                        
 10.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089; Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312. 
 11.  See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306–08 (discussing the due process nexus requirement). 
 12.  This Article refers to the two aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement 
respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the taxpayer—and “transactional nexus”—nexus 
with the activity taxed.  Others have used different terms to refer to the same concepts.  See Arthur 
R. Rosen & Marc D. Bernstein, State Taxation of Corporations: The Evolving Danger of Attribu-
tional Nexus, 41 TAX EXECUTIVE 533, 534 (1989) (referring to the concepts as “presence nexus” 
and “transactional nexus”); accord Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption 
in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (re-
ferring to the concepts as “enforcement jurisdiction” and “substantive jurisdiction”). 
 13.  See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State 
Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 402–04 (2017). 
 14.  The lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the Due Process Clause and the 
dormant Commerce Clause in jurisdictional settings is not limited to the area of state taxation.  See 
generally John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 121 (2016) (analyzing the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Due Process Clause in the context of personal adjudicative jurisdiction). 
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Clause nexus doctrine in an unhelpful limbo by failing to provide a clear path 
forward for the doctrine. 
This failure has predictably spurred commentary attempting to sort out 
the decision’s meaning, but the commentary has not fully addressed the sig-
nificant crossroads for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine that 
Wayfair created.15  Two paths diverge from the Wayfair crossroads, either of 
which the decision can be read to support: The dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus standard might collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction 
standard, or it might be strengthened into a standard that addresses in earnest 
the threat of economic Balkanization that the dormant Commerce Clause tar-
gets.  Should the dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard be allowed to 
collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, many taxpayers 
would face uncertain and potentially burdensome state tax obligations, which 
may chill their willingness to engage in interstate commerce.16  Taxpayers of 
particular concern are small businesses and entities that facilitate the com-
merce of others such as online marketplaces like Amazon Marketplace and 
eBay, payment intermediaries like MasterCard and Visa, and common carri-
ers like FedEx and UPS. 
To prevent these harms and realize the dormant Commerce Clause’s 
goal of protecting the national economy from unduly burdensome state ac-
tions, the Wayfair crossroads must be navigated carefully.  Doing so demands 
a robust theory of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement to guide 
the doctrine forward.  This Article will seize on the opportunity presented by 
Wayfair and will develop such a theory—the “compliance burden theory”—
as well as the standard that follows from that theory.  While others have the-
orized the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement in the past,17 this 
                                                        
 15.  E.g., Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kolarik II, Implications of the Supreme Court’s Historic 
Decision in Wayfair, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 125 (2018); Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s Fair, and 
Undue Burden, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 857 (2018); Billy Hamilton, Wayfair Emotional Support, 89 ST. 
TAX NOTES 1067 (2018); Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive and Enforcement 
Jurisdiction in a Post-Wayfair World, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 283 (2018); Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair 
and the Myth of Substantial Nexus, 36 J. ST. TAX’N 27 (2018); Jeffery S. Reed, What Is the New 
Constitutional Test After Wayfair?, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 335 (2018).  Adam Thimmesch, Darien 
Shanske, and David Gamage have examined major implications of the decision in an informative 
series of articles.  See Darien Shanske et al., Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors, 90 ST. 
TAX NOTES 111 (2018); Adam Thimmesch et al., Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax 
Nexus, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 975 (2018) [hereinafter Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism]; Adam 
Thimmesch et al., Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 447 (2018) 
[hereinafter Thimmesch et al., Substantial Nexus].  Others have considered implications of the de-
cision outside of the tax law.  See Allan Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional 
Connection Between State Tax Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. 724 (2019). 
 16.  Professor Preis makes a similar argument in the context of personal adjudicative jurisdic-
tion based on the registration of a business in a state; though the Due Process Clause may be satis-
fied, such exercises of jurisdiction over interstate businesses could prevent those businesses from 
registering in the state or from entering the state at all.  See Preis, supra note 14, at 144–54. 
 17.  See, e.g., David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation 
of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 498–503 (2012) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause 
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Article is the first to incorporate the lessons from Wayfair into the theory and 
to develop a post-Wayfair standard from that theory. 
The compliance burden theory is realized by returning to the fundamen-
tal principle driving the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the protection 
of interstate commerce from undue burdens of state actions.  This Article asks 
what role, if any, a threshold nexus requirement should play in fulfilling this 
principle in the context of state taxation.  A state tax might burden interstate 
commerce through a high tax rate, a distorted tax base, or heavy tax compli-
ance costs. 
Established guardrails protect interstate commerce from unduly burden-
some tax rates and tax bases, but heavy tax compliance costs present a dif-
ferent breed of problem for interstate commerce.  Tax compliance costs in-
clude the labor and systems required to ensure taxes are correctly paid, the 
ability to access funds to pay the tax, and the costs and risks associated with 
handling audits by state revenue departments.18  These costs are relatively 
flat; they hit interstate commerce immediately once a state tax is imposed and 
change little as the amount of the activity taxed increases.19 
A threshold nexus inquiry is uniquely situated to protect interstate com-
merce from the burden of tax compliance costs by preventing the taxing state 
from imposing a tax (and thus the tax compliance costs) on interstate com-
merce until the amount of activity in the state is profitable enough to cover 
the compliance costs.  From this conclusion arises the compliance burden 
theory.  The theory requires the dormant Commerce Clause nexus require-
ment to target tax compliance costs,20 rather than simply collapsing into the 
                                                        
nexus requirement is concerned about the excess burden placed on interstate taxpayers subject to 
multiple tax compliance regimes); Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 
331–39 (2018) (offering a rationale for the physical presence rule based on the taxpayer’s ability to 
access funds from the activity taxed); Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, 
and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1144–45 (2016) (offering a political rationale for the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement in that it allowed the Supreme Court to pass the issue to Con-
gress); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2008) (offering a political-voice-based justifi-
cation for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus and apportionment regimes). 
 18.  See infra note 180. 
 19.  See infra note 181.  
 20.  Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion pre-Wayfair.  See Gamage & Heck-
man, supra note 17, at 497 (“[T]he burden on interstate commerce that troubled the Court in Quill 
arises solely from the potential for remote vendors to be subject to excess tax compliance costs.”); 
John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-
First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 361–64 (2003) (arguing for the Quill Court’s concern with cu-
mulative tax compliance burdens on multistate taxpayers); Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Ap-
proach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 110–12 
(2018) (discussing dormant Commerce Clause issues presented by cumulative tax compliance bur-
dens).  However, those commentators’ analyses differ from this Article because they argue the sub-
stantial nexus requirement is concerned with the cumulative burden of multiple taxing jurisdictions 
placing tax compliance costs on interstate commerce, whereas this Article argues such cumulative 
   
6 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:1 
due process personal jurisdiction standard.  The answer to Justice So-
tomayor’s question—“So how many sales does it take?”21—is that it depends 
on the profitability of the sales and the difficulty of complying with the state 
tax. 
This Article will make the case for aligning the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus doctrine with the compliance burden theory in order to ensure 
that interstate commerce is appropriately protected from the burdens of state 
taxes.  First, Part I will provide the necessary background to understand the 
challenges and opportunities that the historical dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus case law presents for developing the nexus doctrine in this way.  That 
discussion will culminate in an exploration of the crossroads at which Way-
fair has left the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. 
Part II, then, will map out in detail the compliance burden theory and 
the standard that follows from that theory before Part III will provide the path 
forward for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine.  This path for-
ward is illustrated by looking ahead to litigation expected to spawn from the 
questions left unanswered by Wayfair.  For instance, many states are expand-
ing their sales tax collection laws to apply to marketplaces that connect ven-
dors to consumers, such as Amazon Marketplace and eBay.  Anticipated 
challenges to these unprecedented expansions of state tax power provide op-
portunities to build on Wayfair by articulating a clearer dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus standard than Wayfair did. 
With the case for a dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine that 
meaningfully focuses on tax compliance costs having been laid out, Part IV 
will conclude.  The Wayfair case marks a high point for coherence in the 
evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine and presents an 
opportunity for continued growth.  As this Article will demonstrate, this op-
portunity must be seized upon rather than risk harms to interstate commerce 
resulting from an unclear and untargeted dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard.22 
                                                        
burdens are not the proper focus of the substantial nexus requirement.  See infra notes 186–194 and 
accompanying text. 
 21.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 6. 
 22.  Those versed in state taxation may be surprised to find no mention of the term “substantial 
nexus” in this Introduction.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (claiming 
the dormant Commerce Clause requires a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state before the state 
may impose tax on someone or something); see also infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the “substantial nexus” term).  Some who argue that the “substantial nexus” term is mean-
ingless and should be abandoned, see, for example, Pomp, supra note 15, at 29, may be pleased by 
this omission.  This Article avoids the term for much of the discussion in order to avoid obscuring 
the analysis, which is not dependent on labels.  However, the Article does maintain that the “sub-
stantial nexus” term, whether meaningless before or not, provides a clear—if not necessary—place 
to locate the dormant Commerce Clause’s threshold jurisdiction inquiry and offers insight into how 
courts might do so in the future.  See infra Part III. 
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I.  DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS AND WAYFAIR 
When a state attempts to impose a tax, the first legal question is often, 
“Is there nexus?”  “Nexus” is a term of art in the state tax jurisprudence which 
refers to the constitutionally-sufficient connection a state needs with the thing 
it would like to subject to tax.23  Without the appropriate nexus, the state lacks 
the power to tax.  As straightforward as the basic concept may seem, nexus 
doctrine has developed into a complex muddle.  This Part first provides an 
overview of the law on nexus and then turns to how Wayfair affected that 
law, all to provide the necessary background for the analysis that follows. 
A.  Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus Before Wayfair 
During most of the historical state tax jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the U.S. Constitution imposes a nexus requirement on state 
taxes but located that requirement in the Due Process Clause and the Com-
merce Clause together.24  As a result, cases appeared to turn on different ap-
plications of the nexus requirement; some applications bent more towards 
due process fairness and notice rationales while others bent more towards 
preventing undue burdens on interstate commerce.25  The resulting “quag-
mire” of law did not go unnoticed by the Court.26 
In 1992’s Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,27 the Supreme Court addressed 
this quagmire by engaging in the unprecedented splitting of the Due Process 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause analyses of nexus.28  According 
to the Quill Court, this split was appropriate because of the different natures 
of the inquiries under each clause.29 
As explained in Quill, the Due Process Clause demands that a taxing 
state have nexus with the person it seeks to tax.30  The basic rationales for the 
due process nexus requirement are to ensure the fundamental fairness of state 
taxation and to ensure the taxpayer has notice of the state’s tax jurisdiction 
                                                        
 23.  See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 5, at 555. 
 24.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (“[A]lthough we have not always been precise in distinguishing 
between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.”); see 
also Pomp, supra note 17, at 1149 (“Prior to Quill, the Court never had any reason to specify 
whether a nexus decision was grounded on one clause or the other.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., infra note 55 (comparing two cases with similar fact patterns which were decided 
by invoking different constitutional concerns). 
 26.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–16 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1959) (“[O]ur law in this area is something of a ‘quagmire’ and the 
‘application of constitutional principles to specific state statutes leaves much room for controversy 
and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispen-
sable power of taxation.’”). 
 27.  504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 28.  Id. at 313.  For a thorough analysis of the Quill decision and its flaws, see Pomp, supra 
note 17, at 1141–54. 
 29.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 305–06. 
 30.  Id. at 312. 
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over them.31  This due process nexus requirement is satisfied, the Supreme 
Court has explained, when the taxpayer purposefully avails themself of the 
state’s marketplace and the state provides some benefit in return to the tax-
payer.32  For the most part, the due process nexus standard maps on to the 
due process standard for personal jurisdiction, which considers whether the 
person has “minimum contacts” with the state.33  Although the due process 
nexus requirement is not the focus of this Article, it does provide an important 
contrast to the nexus requirement of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
According to the Quill Court, the dormant Commerce Clause requires 
something different than the Due Process Clause: a “substantial nexus.”34  
The Quill Court gleaned this substantial nexus requirement from the 1977 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady35 case, but it was not clear that the Com-
plete Auto Court thought the term “substantial nexus” had legal signifi-
cance.36  The term first appeared in the tax case law in Complete Auto,37 and 
the Complete Auto Court casually interchanged “substantial nexus” with the 
term “sufficient nexus” throughout the opinion.38 
Despite the term’s history, the Quill Court did little to clarify the mean-
ing of “substantial nexus”—so little that some commentators have argued 
that the term should be recognized as problematic and abandoned.39  How-
ever, the Court did offer an explanation of the driving force behind this 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement: “structural concerns about 
the effects of state regulation on the national economy.”40  For the first time 
in the jurisprudence, the Court explicitly set the dormant Commerce Clause 
                                                        
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See Holderness, supra note 13, 402–04 (exploring the requirements of the due process 
nexus). 
 33.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08 (finding that due process nexus considerations are “comparable” 
to due process personal jurisdiction considerations). 
 34.  Id. at 311 (“[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the 
‘tax . . . is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State . . . .’” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977))). 
 35.  430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 36.  Id. at 279. 
 37.  Pomp, supra note 17, at 1147. 
 38.  See id.  Compare Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (“These decisions . . . have sustained a 
tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”), with Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 
(“[T]he Court held that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be 
subjected to state taxation, provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to 
local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the tax.”). 
 39.  See Pomp, supra note 17, at 1144–45 (arguing that the “substantial nexus” term is prob-
lematic in part because the term was not intended to have the meaning ascribed to it by the Quill 
Court, which utilized the term as a tool for the Court to split the nexus analysis to allow Congress 
to overturn the physical presence rule). 
 40.  Quill Corp. v. South Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). 
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limitations on state tax power apart from those of the Due Process Clause.41  
The Court also observed that the standards are “not identical” and “while a 
State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax 
a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Com-
merce Clause.”42 
Finally, the Quill Court appeared to effectively recognize two aspects 
of this dormant Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirement by asking 
whether the “tax . . . is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the 
taxing State” and by examining whether the taxpayer had a physical presence 
in the taxing state.43  This Article refers to these two aspects of the substantial 
nexus requirement respectively as “personal nexus”—nexus with the tax-
payer—and “transactional nexus”—nexus with the activity taxed.44  The fol-
lowing chart provides a visual summary of the various nexus requirements 
discussed above.45 
  
                                                        
 41.  See supra note 28. 
 42.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.  Many commentators have argued that the substantial nexus stand-
ard should not impose a higher bar on states than the due process nexus standard.  See, e.g., Jesse 
H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure 
Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 213 (1998) (“We do not interpret the Commerce Clause to 
require a separate nexus more stringent than that imposed by the Due Process Clause because that 
is not required to further protect interstate commerce against state taxes that accord a preference to 
local enterprises.”); Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local Taxation, 67 
TAX LAW. 623, 630 (2014) (“If the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum contacts with a 
state, the Commerce Clause does not require a greater number of contacts.”); Adam B. Thimmesch, 
The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 188–91 (2012) (discussing “[t]he 
[g]ratuitous [e]levation of the Commerce Clause over the Due Process Clause”). 
 43.  See Holderness, supra note 17, at 330–31.  Compare Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing the 
Complete Auto test, which includes the transactional nexus requirement, with approval), with Quill, 
504 U.S. at 317–18 (upholding the requirement that the taxpayer have a physical presence in the 
taxing state in order to create substantial nexus). 
 44.  See supra note 12. 
 45.  As the following discussion lays bare, the nexus concepts are not neat and tidy.  Readers 
should be cautious of allowing the tidiness of this chart to bleed into their understanding of the 
nexus concepts.  Instead, the chart offers a high-level view of the types of nexus issues that have 
arisen in the jurisprudence; often it is difficult to carve out the limits of the nexus issues or to avoid 
overlap of the issues.  
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The following two subsections separately explore the history behind the 
personal nexus and transactional nexus aspects of the substantial nexus re-
quirement to provide the background necessary to evaluate the impact of 
Wayfair on the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine. 
1.  Personal Nexus 
Although the personal nexus aspect of the substantial nexus requirement 
was first explicitly recognized in Quill,46 the roots of the aspect are found in 
pre-Quill case law,47 particularly 1967’s National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue of Illinois.48  In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether Illinois had the authority to require an out-of-state vendor to 
collect sales and use taxes on mail order sales to the state’s residents.49  The 
company had no physical location or employees in the state, accepted the 
orders outside of the state, and delivered them into the state through common 
carrier.50  The company’s only arguable physical presence in Illinois ap-
peared to be the catalogues that it mailed to potential customers.51 
Considering these facts, the Bellas Hess Court declared: 
                                                        
 46.  504 U.S. at 309–18 (discussing the personal nexus requirement). 
 47.  Prior to Quill, the Court’s tendency to refer to both the Due Process Clause and the dormant 
Commerce Clause together when discussing nexus obscured the source of the personal nexus re-
quirement, and it might have been argued that such connections were solely due process concerns.  
See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 356–58 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting in part, concurring in part) (arguing that both the origin states and market states in the Dil-
worth and General Trading Co. cases should have jurisdiction to tax under the Due Process Clause, 
and that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with more substantive effects of the taxes at 
issue).  Such arguments continued to be made after Quill.  Professor Pomp cautions against such 
arguments given the lack of clarity from the decisions.  Pomp, supra note 17, at 1149–50. 
 48.  386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 49.  Id. at 754.  Professor Pomp provides an expert dissection of the Bellas Hess case in Pomp, 
supra note 17, at 1133–40. 
 50.  Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754–55. 
 51.  Id. 
Tax Jurisdiction
Due Process 
Clause
Nexus 
(akin to personal 
jurisdiction)
Dormant 
Commerce Clause
Substantial Nexus
Personal Nexus 
(nexus with the 
taxpayer)
Transactional 
Nexus (nexus with 
the activity taxed)
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 In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens 
on National [Bellas Hess] in this case, we would have to repudiate 
totally the sharp distinction which these and other decisions have 
drawn between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or 
property within a State, and those who do no more than communi-
cate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part 
of a general interstate business.  But this basic distinction, which 
until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing author-
ities, is a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it.52 
In this way, the Bellas Hess Court displayed concern over the type of 
connection a potential taxpayer has with the taxing state—a concern over the 
scope of the personal nexus requirement.  By drawing a line between mail 
order vendors and brick and mortar retailers, the Court indicated the personal 
nexus requirement could be, and perhaps must be, satisfied by the physical 
presence of the taxpayer.53 
 Although it is risky to characterize pre-Quill nexus decisions as address-
ing due process requirements or dormant Commerce Clause requirements be-
cause the cases rarely addressed the clauses separately,54 the dormant Com-
merce Clause concerns underpinning the Bellas Hess decision are clear.55  In 
                                                        
 52.  Id. at 758 (footnote omitted). 
 53.  The Bellas Hess Court’s view of the taxpayer’s physical presence as a necessary condition 
for personal nexus is unclear because the Court relied on cases where the taxpayer was physically 
present in the taxing state for its position in Bellas Hess.  See Holderness, supra note 17, at 353 
(explaining that the Bellas Hess Court appropriately observed that its prior decisions had not found 
personal nexus with a taxpayer lacking a physical presence in the state but failed to contextualize 
this observation by noting that all but one of those decisions involved taxpayers physically present 
in the taxing states). 
 54.  Pomp, supra note 17, at 1149–50. 
 55.  Bellas Hess may be characterized as expressing dormant Commerce Clause concerns by 
comparing it to another case with similar substantive facts, Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland.  347 
U.S. 340 (1954).  Miller Brothers involved Maryland’s effort to require a Delaware-based store to 
collect Maryland’s use tax on products the store sold to Maryland residents in Maryland.  Id. at 341–
42.  As relevant here, the Miller Brothers business had no physical location or employees in Mary-
land, accepted the orders in question in Delaware, and delivered them into the state through common 
carrier.  Id.  The relevant difference between Miller Brothers and Bellas Hess is that the Miller 
Brothers were found not to have systematically exploited the Maryland marketplace, unlike Na-
tional Bellas Hess’s efforts to make sales into Illinois.  Compare id. at 347 (“Here was no invasion 
or exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland.”), with Bellas Hess, 368 U.S. at 754–55 
(“Twice a year catalogues are mailed to the company’s active or recent customers throughout the 
Nation, including Illinois.  This mailing is supplemented by advertising ‘flyers’ which are occasion-
ally mailed to past and potential customers.”).  
Because of Miller Brothers’ lack of exploitation of the Maryland marketplace, the Court held 
that Maryland had no tax jurisdiction over the business and further stated that “we need not consider 
whether the statute imposes an unjustifiable burden upon interstate commerce.”  Miller Bros., 347 
U.S. at 347.  Thus, viewed in today’s terms, the Miller Brothers decision not only invoked due 
process standards of purposeful availment in reaching its decision, it also specifically stated that the 
dormant Commerce Clause inquiry was moot.  Miller Brothers must be understood as a due process 
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reaching its decision, the Bellas Hess Court observed, “The many variations 
in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-
keeping requirements could entangle [National Bellas Hess’s] interstate busi-
ness in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with 
no legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local govern-
ment.’”56  This concern for the burden on National Bellas Hess’s interstate 
business echoed the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause, not the no-
tice and fairness concerns of the Due Process Clause.57 
In 1992, Quill advanced the personal nexus doctrine from Bellas Hess 
in a number of ways.  After explicitly separating the substantial nexus re-
quirement from the due process nexus requirement and articulating the per-
sonal nexus aspect of substantial nexus,58 the Quill Court clarified that the 
physical presence rule it derived from Bellas Hess—a taxpayer must have a 
physical presence in a state before the state can require it to collect sales and 
use taxes59—was housed under the dormant Commerce Clause personal 
nexus aspect.60 
Perhaps most important to the post-Wayfair world, the Quill Court also 
articulated the different motivations for the two nexus inquires.  The Court 
explained that “the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like due process’ 
‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for 
limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”61  In a footnote, the Court 
described how a tax might unduly burden interstate commerce: 
[A]bsent the [physical presence] rule, a publisher who included a 
subscription card in three issues of its magazine, a vendor whose 
                                                        
nexus case.  In contrast, the Bellas Hess Court could not have relied solely on due process consid-
erations to deny Illinois’s jurisdiction over the taxpayer because National Bellas Hess was actively 
exploiting the Illinois marketplace.  
One difficulty in comparing the two cases is that the Miller Brothers Company did target Mar-
yland customers in similar ways as National Bellas Hess targeted Illinois customers.  See Bellas 
Hess, 368 U.S. at 758 (“[In Miller Brothers,] the seller advertised its wares to Maryland residents 
through newspaper and radio advertising, in addition to mailing circulars four times a year.  As a 
result, it made substantial sales to Maryland customers, and made deliveries to them by its own 
trucks and drivers.”).  To accept the point made here in this Article, one must accept the Miller 
Brothers Court’s questionable legal determination that there was no exploitation of the Maryland 
market by the store.  The Bellas Hess Court did not make such a finding in its decision and strangely 
attempted to distinguish the Miller Brothers conclusion as being about how much of the commerce 
was interstate commerce.  Id. at 759. 
For further dissection of the Miller Brothers case, the faults within it, and what might have 
been, see Pomp, supra note 17, at 1121–32. 
 56.  Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759–60 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 
249, 253 (1946). 
 57.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (detailing the concerns of the 
Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 58.  See supra notes 28–43 and accompanying text. 
 59.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. 
 60.  Id. at 318. 
 61.  Id. at 313. 
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radio advertisements were heard in North Dakota on three occa-
sions, and a corporation whose telephone sales force made three 
calls into the State, all would be subject to the [use tax] collection 
duty.  What is more significant, similar obligations might be im-
posed by the Nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions.62 
In short, tax obligations resulting from small connections with the tax-
ing state troubled the Court, as did the potential for such obligations to spread 
across the country if North Dakota’s law was upheld.  However, the under-
lying nature of the Court’s concerns remained somewhat obscure after Quill.  
Perhaps the administrative costs to an interstate taxpayer of complying with 
tax regimes were at the core of the concerns,63 or perhaps the Court was anx-
ious about the overall tax burden that might fall to interstate taxpayers if the 
personal nexus standard was loosened.64  The Court would provide no further 
guidance until Wayfair.65 
2.  Transactional Nexus 
Transactional nexus has a longer, though perhaps quieter, history in the 
case law than personal nexus.  The best place to start when uncovering the 
transactional nexus requirement is with the 1944 companion cases of McLeod 
v. J.E. Dilworth Co.66 and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of 
Iowa.67  In these cases, the Supreme Court considered nearly identical fact 
patterns: an out-of-state vendor sold to residents of the taxing state, and the 
products sold were delivered into the state from out of state by common car-
rier.68  In the Court’s view, the only relevant difference was that in Dilworth, 
Arkansas demanded the vendor collect a sales tax imposed on the sales trans-
actions involving Arkansas residents,69 and in General Trading Co., Iowa 
                                                        
 62.  Id. at 313 n.6. 
 63.  See id.; Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967). 
 64.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–16 (“Undue burdens on interstate commerce may be avoided 
not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or 
taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity 
that is free from interstate taxation.”); Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759 (“And if the power of Illinois to 
impose use tax burdens upon National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct 
of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote.  For if Illinois can impose such 
burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and 
every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes.”). 
 65.  See Holderness, supra note 17, at 315–16 (observing that the Supreme Court rejected cer-
tiorari in all challenges to the physical presence rule after Quill and until Wayfair). 
 66.  322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
 67.  322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
 68.  Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328; General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 337. 
 69.  Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327 (“We are asked to reverse a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas holding that the Commerce Clause precludes liability for the sales tax of that State upon 
the transactions to be set forth.”). 
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demanded the vendor collect a use tax imposed on the in-state use of the 
products originally sold in Minnesota.70 
Because the states imposed different taxes, the cases reached different 
results.  Though personal nexus arguably existed with respect to each out-of-
state vendor, Arkansas could not require the vendor to collect its sales tax,71 
but Iowa was permitted to require the vendor to collect its use tax.72  Trans-
actional nexus was at the core of these decisions; in Dilworth, Arkansas 
simply lacked a sufficient connection with the sales it sought to tax because 
they were consummated outside of the state (i.e., there was no local sale for 
Arkansas to tax), whereas in General Trading Co., Iowa had such a connec-
tion with the in-state use of the products sold.73  It did not matter to the Court 
that sales and use taxes are complementary and often reach the same eco-
nomic result.74 
                                                        
 70.  General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336 (“The question now presented is, in short, whether 
Iowa may collect, in the circumstances of this case, such a use tax from General Trading Company, 
a Minnesota corporation, on the basis of property bought from Trading Company and sent by it 
from Minnesota to purchasers in Iowa for use and enjoyment there.”).  Although sales taxes and use 
taxes are formally imposed on separate transactions, they have largely been thought of as econom-
ically equivalent taxes on consumption.  See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 17, at 347; Charles E. 
McLure Jr., State/Local Taxes on Interstate Commerce: Legitimacy and Fairness, 93 TAX NOTES 
7703, ¶¶ 9–16 (2001).  The use tax is often framed as merely a backstop to the sales tax, necessary 
only because of the historically limited jurisdictional reach of sales taxes.  See RICHARD D. POMP, 
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, at 6-39 to 6-44 (9th ed., 2019); see also Robert C. Brown, The 
Future of Use Taxes, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1941); Paul J. Hartman, Sales Taxation 
in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138, 165 (1956). 
 71.  Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transaction would be to 
project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate transaction.”). 
 72.  General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (observing “the right of Iowa . . . to exact a use tax 
from purchasers on mail order goods forwarded into Iowa from without the State”). 
 73.  Compare Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“We would have to destroy both business and legal 
notions to deny that under these circumstances the sale—the transfer of ownership—was made in 
Tennessee.”), with General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (“The tax is what it professes to be—a 
non-discriminatory excise laid on all personal property consumed in Iowa.  The property is enjoyed 
by an Iowa resident partly because the opportunity is given by Iowa to enjoy property no matter 
whence acquired.  The exaction is made against the ultimate consumer—the Iowa resident who is 
paying taxes to sustain his own state government.”); see also Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 
U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (“The fact that under Iowa law the sale is made outside of the state does not 
mean that the power of Iowa ‘has nothing on which to operate.’  The purchaser is in Iowa and the 
tax is upon use in Iowa.  The validity of such a tax, so far as the purchaser is concerned, ‘has been 
withdrawn from the arena of debate.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny 
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); and then quoting Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583 
(1937))). 
 74.  Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330 (“A sales tax and a use tax in many instances may bring about 
the same result.  But they are different in conception, are assessments upon different transactions, 
and in the interlacings of the two legislative authorities within our federation may have to justify 
themselves on different constitutional grounds.”). 
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In what would turn out to be a highly influential opinion to the Quill 
Court,75 Justice Rutledge penned a partial dissent, partial concurrence that 
addressed both the Dilworth and General Trading Co. cases.76  In his opinion, 
Justice Rutledge argued there was no room for a nexus inquiry under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.77  In his view, issues of state tax jurisdiction 
were due process concerns, and the dormant Commerce Clause should be 
setting rules of tax priority between multiple states that have jurisdiction over 
the activity taxed.78  Therefore, he believed both Arkansas and Iowa had 
nexus with the consumption they sought to tax through their respective sales 
tax and use tax, and he rejected the opposing outcomes of the Dilworth and 
General Trading Co. cases as based on formalistic distinctions.79  Justice 
Rutledge argued the dormant Commerce Clause would provide a remedy 
only once interstate consumption was subject to higher cumulative tax bur-
dens than intrastate consumption, and the remedy would be to prioritize the 
market state’s right to tax over that of the origin state.80 
By articulating different motivations behind the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause in the state tax context 
and analyzing those requirements separately, Justice Rutledge’s opinion laid 
groundwork for the splitting of the due process and dormant Commerce 
Clause analyses in Quill.81  However, when the Quill Court made that split, 
it failed to also adopt Justice Rutledge’s position that the dormant Commerce 
Clause did not contain a nexus requirement.  Instead, the Quill Court ap-
peared to incorporate the transactional nexus requirement into the dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis by claiming, “[W]e will sustain a tax against a 
Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax . . . is applied to an activity 
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State . . . .’”82 
                                                        
 75.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1992) (quoting Justice Rutledge’s 
opinion before proceeding to “[h]eed[] Justice Rutledge’s counsel, [and] consider each constitu-
tional limit in turn.”). 
 76.  Justice Rutledge’s opinion was filed in the case of International Harvester Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury, which was a third companion case to Dilworth and General Trading Co.  322 
U.S. 340 (1944).  
 77.  Id. at 356–58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (arguing that both the 
origin states and market states in the Dilworth and General Trading Co. cases should have jurisdic-
tion to tax under the due process clause, and that the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with 
more substantive effects of the taxes at issue). 
 78.  Id. at 359. 
 79.  Id. at 352 (“The only other difference is in the terms used by Iowa and Arkansas, respec-
tively, to describe their taxes . . . . Other things being the same, constitutionality should not turn on 
whether one name or the other is applied by the state.”). 
 80.  Id. at 361 (“If in this case it were necessary to choose between the state of origin and that 
of market for the exercise of exclusive power to tax, or for requiring allowance of credit in order to 
avoid the cumulative burden, in my opinion the choice should lie in favor of the state of market 
rather than the state of origin.”). 
 81.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1992). 
 82.  Id. at 311. 
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Dilworth and General Trading Co. offer a rare source for discerning the 
demands of the transactional nexus requirement because usually there is no 
controversy around whether transactional nexus exists.  For example, no 
transactional nexus issue existed in Quill because the activity taxed clearly 
took place in the taxing state.83  The development of the transactional nexus 
doctrine has thus been subtler than that of the personal nexus doctrine, as 
only a few cases have offered sparse additional insight into the transactional 
nexus requirement. 
In the 1951 case, Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,84 the 
taxpayer was a manufacturer based in Massachusetts that had established an 
office and warehouse in Illinois.85  The taxpayer made local retail sales out 
of the Illinois office and also made mail order sales to Illinois residents out 
of its Massachusetts establishments.86  The taxpayer argued those mail order 
sales could not be included in its Illinois tax base because they were made in 
interstate commerce.87  Though the idea that interstate commerce cannot be 
subject to state taxation has since been abandoned, the Court denied the tax-
payer’s challenge because the Illinois office performed multiple functions in 
the state relating to the mail order sales.88 
In reaching its decision and important to the transactional nexus con-
cept, the Court observed, “Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to 
bring the transaction within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable.”89  
The Court cited Dilworth for this position.  Further, the Court stated that 
when a taxpayer “has gone into the State to do local business by state per-
mission and has submitted itself to the taxing power of the State, it can avoid 
taxation on some Illinois sales only by showing that particular transactions 
are dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature.”90  Though 
the Norton Court couched its analysis in terms of whether an activity was 
local or interstate in nature, the decision indicates that an activity must have 
some local connection to a state before the state can tax it—transactional 
nexus is required. 
In the 1989 case Goldberg v. Sweet,91 the Court considered whether Il-
linois could impose an excise tax on telecommunications that originated or 
                                                        
 83.  See id. at 301 (“This case . . . involves a State’s attempt to require an out-of-state mail-
order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax 
on goods purchased for use within the State.” (emphasis added)). 
 84.  340 U.S. 534 (1951). 
 85.  Id. at 535. 
 86.  Id. at 536. 
 87.  Id. at 535–36. 
 88.  Id. at 538–39. 
 89.  Id. at 537. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
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terminated in the state and were charged to a service address in the state.92  
Although the Court initially dismissed transactional nexus concerns as 
moot,93 it later returned to the question with brief, but somewhat illuminating, 
dicta as it discussed concerns about multiple taxation:94 
We doubt that States through which the telephone call’s electronic 
signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus to tax that call.  We 
also doubt that termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, 
provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a call. 
 We believe that only two States have a nexus substantial enough 
to tax a consumer’s purchase of an interstate telephone call.  The 
first is a State like Illinois which taxes the origination or termina-
tion of an interstate telephone call charged to a service address 
within that State.  The second is a State which taxes the origination 
or termination of an interstate telephone call billed or paid within 
that State.95 
While the Court did not expand on why it held the nexus beliefs it artic-
ulated, this dicta demonstrates that the transactional nexus aspect demands 
some local hook for the activity taxed beyond its simple beginning, end, and 
location.  The importance of a local billing or service address to a telephone 
call is unclear, but such an address may indicate to the Court’s satisfaction 
that tax compliance is not too burdensome because some familiarity exists 
between the local taxpayers and the taxing state’s tax system.  Alternatively, 
the administrative near-impossibility of taxing telecommunications based on 
the location of the signals may have caused the Court to fear that if a state 
like Illinois was not permitted to tax the telecommunications, no state would 
be able to, effectively shielding the interstate activities from state taxation 
and setting the clock back on the state taxation of interstate commerce.96 
In 1995 in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,97 the Su-
preme Court considered whether Oklahoma could impose its sales tax on the 
full value of bus tickets sold in Oklahoma for interstate travel.98  Relying on 
Goldberg and earlier cases, the Court had no difficulty proclaiming that Ok-
                                                        
 92.  Id. at 254–57. 
 93.  Id. at 260 (“As all parties agree that Illinois has a substantial nexus with the interstate tel-
ecommunications reached by the Tax Act, we begin our inquiry with apportionment, the second 
prong of the Complete Auto test.”). 
 94.  Id. at 262–63.  
 95.  Id. at 263 (citations omitted) (first citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 
631 (1973); then citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302–04 (1944) (Jack-
son, J., concurring); and then citing Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 
(1967)). 
 96.  Thanks to Professor Pomp for bringing this concern to my attention.  See infra note 170 
for cases rejecting state tax immunity for interstate commerce. 
 97.  514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 98.  Id. at 177. 
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lahoma had “‘nexus’ aplenty” with the sales, thus no transactional nexus con-
troversy existed.99  Jefferson Lines advanced the transactional nexus doctrine 
by clarifying that the inquiry is not a means of prioritizing different states’ 
tax claims; rather, it is a simple threshold connection question.100 
Although transactional nexus issues have not surfaced at the Supreme 
Court level with much frequency, numerous lower courts have addressed the 
transactional nexus requirement, often citing to Dilworth.101  Thus, the trans-
actional nexus requirement was alive and well, though underdeveloped and 
undertheorized, pre-Wayfair.102 
Heading into Wayfair then, states and taxpayers were faced with a dys-
functional physical presence rule for personal nexus and a conclusory trans-
actional nexus standard that had created highly formalistic distinctions re-
garding state tax jurisdiction.  Hopes were high that the Supreme Court would 
introduce more coherence into the substantial nexus doctrine by abandoning 
the physical presence rule and the formalism in the transactional nexus doc-
trine.  As detailed in the next section, Wayfair partially delivered on these 
hopes by delivering a narrow opinion which discarded the physical presence 
rule but left the greater dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine unsettled. 
B.  Wayfair: Substantial Nexus at a Crossroads 
As the evolutions of the personal nexus and the transactional nexus doc-
trines demonstrate, the dormant Commerce Clause’s substantial nexus juris-
prudence is, at a minimum, complex.  Much of the complexity was created 
                                                        
 99.  Id. at 184 (quoting D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988)). 
 100.  Id. (“[T]he taxpayer does not deny Oklahoma’s substantial nexus to the in-state portion of 
the bus service, but rather argues that nexus to the State is insufficient as to the portion of travel 
outside its borders.  This point, however, goes to the second prong of Complete Auto . . . .”).  The 
full dormant Commerce Clause test relied on in Quill derives from the Complete Auto case and is 
referred to as the “Complete Auto test.”  The second prong of the test demands that a tax be fairly 
apportioned to the amount of activity occurring in the taxing state.  See infra note 155 and accom-
panying text for a full description of the Complete Auto test. 
 101.  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 990 P.2d 59, 66 (Colo. 1999); TA 
Operating Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 767 So. 2d 1270, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); World 
Book, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 590 N.W.2d 293, 297–98 (Mich. 1999); Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 
88 N.E.3d 900, 908 (Ohio 2016); Koch Fuels, Inc. v. State (ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n), 862 P.2d 
471, 476–77 (Okla. 1993); Travelscape, LLC v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 705 S.E.2d 28, 37 (S.C. 
2011); State v. Dorhout, 513 N.W.2d 390, 393 (S.D. 1994); Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 839 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992); Irwin Nats. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 P.3d 689, 693 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2016); Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 329 P.3d 131, 148 (Wyo. 
2014). 
 102.  See sources cited supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Gamage & Heckman, 
supra note 17, at 490 (“Together, [Dilworth and General Trading Co.] established a dichotomy 
between sales and use taxes that remains in effect to this day: purchases that occur within a state 
may be subject to sales taxation while purchases from remote vendors may only be subject to use 
taxation.”). 
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by undertheorized expressions of the need for the substantial nexus require-
ment, which led to analytically unsatisfying conclusions about when such 
nexus existed. 
As this Section explains, 2018’s Wayfair decision brought a measure of 
coherence to the personal nexus doctrine but failed to address transactional 
nexus issues or the substantial nexus doctrine more broadly.  In so doing, the 
case brought the substantial nexus doctrine into the twenty-first century but 
left it at a crossroads: the doctrine can either collaps into the due process 
personal jurisdiction standard, or it can be strengthened into a coherent stand-
ard that addresses the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause.  The next 
Part argues for the latter path by developing a robust theory of the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement to guide the doctrine forward. 
1.  A Vague Personal Nexus Standard 
Wayfair was a case about the physical presence rule for personal 
nexus.103  The case came about in an interesting manner.  In response to a 
concurrence by Justice Kennedy in a 2015 case in which the Justice offered 
a scathing critique of the physical presence rule,104 South Dakota passed a 
law which explicitly disregarded the rule for purposes of sales tax collection 
obligations in the state.105  Instead, the South Dakota law imposed a sales tax 
collection obligation on any vendor who collected gross receipts of more than 
$100,000 from sales to South Dakotans or who made more than 200 individ-
ual sales to South Dakotans in the prior year, whether or not the vendor had 
a physical presence in the state.106  Remote vendors were thus targeted for 
new sales tax collection obligations. 
A handful of those remote vendors—Wayfair, Overstock, and 
Newegg.com—refused to comply with the South Dakota law and challenged 
                                                        
 103.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2087–88 (2018). 
 104.  Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Justice Kennedy was far from alone in his critique of the physical presence rule.  See, e.g., Holder-
ness, supra note 17, at 331–39 (critiquing the physical presence rule’s ability to target undue bur-
dens on interstate commerce); Pomp, supra note 17, at 1145–46; Swain, supra note 20, at 361–64. 
 105.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018); see also id. § 10-64-1 (providing legislative find-
ings supporting a law disregarding the physical presence rule including “the general growth of 
online retail” eroding the state’s sales tax base and “the [falling] costs of [use tax] collection . . . 
[g]iven modern computing and software options,” and noting the “argument [for requiring remote 
sellers to collect use taxes] has grown stronger, and the cause more urgent, with time,” given these 
findings). 
 106.  Id. § 10-64-2. 
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its constitutionality.107  The South Dakota courts agreed with the remote ven-
dors,108 and the South Dakota Department of Revenue offered little re-
sistance.109  Instead, the Department focused its efforts on convincing the 
United States Supreme Court to overturn the long standing physical presence 
rule.110  Thus, the briefings and decisions along the way to the Supreme Court 
were narrowly focused on whether South Dakota’s law unconstitutionally 
imposed tax on people lacking personal nexus with the state.111  To win, the 
state needed to prove that anyone falling under its statute had personal nexus 
with the state. 
Although the State achieved its narrow goal and the Supreme Court dis-
carded the physical presence rule,112 the Wayfair decision left the personal 
nexus doctrine (and the greater substantial nexus doctrine) in a vague state. 113  
Narrowly read, Wayfair stands only for the proposition that a taxpayer’s 
physical presence is not necessary to establish personal nexus with the taxing 
state.114  Broader readings hint at how the Court views the role of both aspects 
of the substantial nexus requirement more generally but do not provide clar-
ity.115 
After abandoning the physical presence rule, the Wayfair Court pro-
claimed that personal nexus “is established when the taxpayer [or collector] 
‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that juris-
diction,”116 echoing the due process personal jurisdiction standard.117  For 
this proposition, the Court only cited to dicta from Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City 
                                                        
 107.  See State v. Wayfair, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D.S.D. 2017). 
 108.  State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 760–61 (S.D. 2017) (holding Section 10-64-2 of 
the South Dakota Codified Laws unconstitutional), vacated sub nom. South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 
S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 109.  Id. at 760 (“The State filed a response to the motion for summary judgement agreeing with 
Sellers’ statement of material facts.  The State further agreed that the court would have to grant 
Sellers’ motion for summary judgment based upon Bellas Hess and Quill and indicated its intention 
to pursue review of the issue by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See, e.g., id. at 759–60 (discussing the procedural posture of the case and the briefings and 
motions of the parties). 
 112.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 113.  See sources cited supra note 15. 
 114.  See Thimmesch et al., Substantial Nexus, supra note 15, at 447 (“The Court’s ruling was 
very narrow, though, holding only that the physical presence rule is no longer the governing stand-
ard for purposes of determining when a taxpayer has the substantial nexus required under the Court’s 
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady formulation.”). 
 115.  Id. at 448. 
 116.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (alteration in original) (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of 
Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)). 
 117.  The reference to the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” in the taxing jurisdic-
tion had been used by the Supreme Court in the state tax jurisprudence before Wayfair, but only in 
discussions of due process limitations on state tax actions.  See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes 
of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 437 (1980); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1940). 
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of Valdez,118 which was not decided on dormant Commerce Clause grounds 
and, in any event, involved oil tankers that were physically present in the 
taxing jurisdiction.119  Polar Tankers Inc. provides little guidance for deter-
mining when personal nexus exists if the taxpayer is not physically present 
in the taxing state. 
The Wayfair Court might have expanded on this “substantial privilege” 
standard when deciding that Wayfair had satisfied it, but the Court only of-
fered the following explanation: 
 Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic 
and virtual contacts respondents have with the State.  The Act ap-
plies only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or 
services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate trans-
actions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an 
annual basis.  This quantity of business could not have occurred 
unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carry-
ing on business in South Dakota.  And respondents are large, na-
tional companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence.  Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete 
Auto is satisfied in this case.120 
Rather than explain what it means to avail oneself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in a jurisdiction, the Court simply declared 
that Wayfair had done so because of the quantity of its business with South 
Dakotans and the size and national scope of its business.  The Court may be 
correct, but how should smaller vendors read this opinion?  What if Wayfair 
sold only one $150,000 piece of furniture to a South Dakotan?  Or what if 
Wayfair sold $1.00 trinkets to 200 separate South Dakotans?  The Wayfair 
opinion did not adequately answer these questions because it failed to artic-
ulate a meaning behind the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” 
phrase in the dormant Commerce Clause context.121 
However, Wayfair did not leave the personal nexus standard and the 
substantial nexus doctrine totally rudderless.  The Wayfair Court invoked 
dormant Commerce Clause concerns when it clarified that compliance costs 
weigh heavily in the substantial nexus analysis: 
                                                        
 118.  557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009). 
 119.  See Fatale, supra note 15, at 868; Pomp, supra note 15, at 29. 
 120.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citation omitted). 
 121.  See Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 15, at 130 (“Post-Wayfair, the new substantial nexus 
test turns on whether a taxpayer has availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business 
in the taxing jurisdiction at issue.  In keeping with tradition, the Court left the minimum threshold 
of this sufficiency test undefined, for lower courts to determine.  Because the substantial nexus 
analysis is fact-specific, the only existing guidance for determining the sufficiency of the economic 
and virtual contacts that satisfy this test are the particular South Dakota contacts of the businesses 
involved in the Wayfair litigation.”). 
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 The Quill majority expressed concern that without the physical 
presence rule “a state tax might unduly burden interstate com-
merce” by subjecting retailers to tax collection obligations in thou-
sands of different taxing jurisdictions.  But the administrative costs 
of compliance, especially in the modern economy with its Internet 
technology, are largely unrelated to whether a company happens to 
have a physical presence in a State. . . .  In other words, under 
Quill, a small company with diverse physical presence might be 
equally or more burdened by compliance costs than a large remote 
seller.  The physical presence rule is a poor proxy for the compli-
ance costs faced by companies that do business in multiple 
States.122 
The Court further homed in on its concern with tax compliance costs by 
raising, with seeming approval, various features of the South Dakota law: 
The thresholds protected small sellers, retroactive application of the law was 
forbidden, and South Dakota was a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement,123 which meant the state’s sales tax system had been simpli-
fied by adopting common statutory language and administrative practices 
with other member states.124 
Even so, the Court raised those “features [of South Dakota’s tax system] 
that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon 
interstate commerce” only after claiming “[t]he question remains whether 
some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invali-
date the Act.”125  Although the Wayfair Court was clearly concerned with the 
compliance burdens placed on interstate taxpayers, the Court failed to tie 
those concerns directly to its due-process-esque personal nexus standard.  
Wayfair implied a need for the dormant Commerce Clause personal nexus 
inquiry while simultaneously seeming to collapse the personal nexus stand-
ard into a due process standard which does not target that need. 
2.  A Lack of Transactional Nexus 
For all the disruption it brought to the personal nexus doctrine, Wayfair 
did little with respect to the transactional nexus doctrine.  As noted, the deci-
sion and the parties focused on the personal nexus issue.  However, the South 
Dakota law at issue in Wayfair required out-of-state vendors to collect tax on 
                                                        
 122.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (citation omitted) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298, 313 n.16 (1992)). 
 123.  Id. at 2099–2100. 
 124.  See About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., https://www.stream-
linedsalestax.org/about-us/about-sstgb (last visited June 4, 2019); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 
2099–2100. 
 125.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
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sales to South Dakota residents.126  Under Dilworth, South Dakota likely 
lacks transactional nexus with those sales and thus has no jurisdiction over 
them, regardless of its jurisdiction over the vendors themselves.127  Thus, a 
transactional nexus issue lurked behind the Wayfair litigation.128 
The parties to the Wayfair litigation did not raise the lurking transac-
tional nexus issue,129 and the Court effectively ignored the issue by claiming 
without support that “[a]ll concede that taxing the sales in question here is 
lawful”130 and “[a]ll agree that South Dakota has the authority to tax these 
transactions.”131  While it is true that the use of the sold products would be 
taxable, the sales themselves should not be.  This lack of attention to the 
transactional nexus issue is concerning—the issue threatened to immunize 
those out-of-state sales from taxation by South Dakota132—and open to inter-
pretation. 
A broad reading of Wayfair in this context may indicate that the formal-
ism of past jurisprudence is a bygone relic.  The Court’s description of eve-
ryone as agreeing the sales were taxable and its cavalier references to both 
sales and use taxes as sales taxes throughout the opinion suggest the Court 
viewed sales and use taxes as equivalent taxes,133 at least in the context of the 
personal nexus discussion.  As personal nexus is not concerned with the ac-
tivity taxed, but rather with the taxpayer, this equivalence should be uncon-
troversial—the potential taxpayers of both taxes are the consumer and the 
                                                        
 126.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
seller . . . shall remit the sales tax . . . .” (emphasis added)); see Hayes R. Holderness & Matthew C. 
Boch, Did South Dakota Neglect Transactional Nexus in Its Bill to Kill Quill?, DAILY TAX REPORT: 
STATE, Dec. 6, 2017, at 1; Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 
58 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2019). 
 127.  See supra note 71; see also Holderness & Boch, supra note 126, at 4 (“[B]y limiting the 
scope of the new economic nexus rule to sales taxes, South Dakota has put up an additional hurdle 
in the way of the victory it desires.  The state may find that even if it wins on the physical presence 
issue, it will remain unable to tax the proceeds from sales of products delivered into the state by 
common carrier, and additional legislation will be necessary.”). 
 128.  See Holderness & Boch, supra note 126; Pomp, supra note 126; Thimmesch et al., Sales 
Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 975–76. 
 129.  See Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 976. 
 130.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087. 
 131.  Id. at 2092. 
 132.  Thus, there being no taxable transactions to collect tax on, Wayfair would have no actual 
tax collection obligation.  See Holderness & Boch, supra note 126. 
 133.  See Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 976.  See generally Wayfair, 
138 S. Ct. at 2080. 
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vendor.134  The Court’s failure to go further and distinguish the taxes on trans-
actional nexus grounds might be viewed as a repudiation of the Dil-
worth/General Trading Co. dichotomy.135 
On the other hand, a more conservative reading of the Wayfair decision 
indicates that the case is properly viewed solely as a personal nexus case, 
leaving intact the transactional nexus jurisprudence and the Dilworth/Gen-
eral Trading Co. dichotomy.136  The parties did not raise or brief the transac-
tional nexus issue, and the Court did not raise it sua sponte during any of the 
proceedings.137  The issue is not directly mentioned in the decision.138  Re-
ferring to use taxes as sales taxes is a common colloquial practice.139  Lower 
court decisions have continued to rely on the historical transactional nexus 
doctrine,140 and Wayfair’s indirect references to any transactional nexus is-
sues in the case do not engage with that historical doctrine.  As with the per-
sonal nexus doctrine, Wayfair leaves the transactional nexus doctrine in a 
vague state: Does it remain controlled by formalistic distinctions, or has a 
more substantive analysis been allowed to creep in?141  The operation of 
South Dakota’s law and taxpayer certainty depends on the answer to this 
question. 
3.  The Wayfair Crossroads 
By shaking the traditional personal nexus analysis apart and failing to 
address transactional nexus concerns, the Wayfair case leaves the substantial 
nexus doctrine at a crossroads.  Wayfair’s personal nexus standard is vague 
and reminiscent of the due process personal jurisdiction standard and does 
                                                        
 134.  Holderness, supra note 17, at 320–21 (describing sales tax and use tax collection regimes); 
Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 976 (“Read in its entirety, Wayfair sug-
gests that the Court viewed the difference in the taxes as a difference in who remits them—sales 
taxes being collected and remitted by vendors and use taxes being paid directly by consumers.”). 
 135.  See Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 976 (considering, through 
rejecting, this implied repudiation of the Dilworth/General Trading Co. dichotomy). 
 136.  See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088 (“The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope 
and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases.”); see also Gamage & Heckman, 
supra note 17, at 490; Holderness & Boch, supra note 126; Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, 
supra note 15, at 976. 
 137.  See supra note 129. 
 138.  See generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080. 
 139.  See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.01 (3d ed. 
2001) (observing that the term “sales tax” is often used to describe a large variety of taxes, including 
the use tax); Andrew J. Haile, Sales Tax Exceptionalism, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 136, 141 n.12 (2013); 
Thimmesch et al., Sales Tax Formalism, supra note 15, at 976 (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s 
opinion explicitly noted that the South Dakota statute imposed a sales tax collection obligation, but 
the reference seems to have been more colloquial than technical.”). 
 140.  See supra note 101. 
 141.  See Holderness & Boch, supra note 126, at 6 (“If certiorari is granted, though, the transac-
tional nexus problem would be an opportunity for the Court to revisit and refresh its relatively dated 
transactional nexus jurisprudence.”). 
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not clearly address the Court’s concern for the burden that compliance costs 
associated with state taxes might impose on interstate commerce.142  Like-
wise, the Court’s casual dismissal of any transactional nexus concerns lurk-
ing in the case leaves the traditional formalistic transactional nexus standard 
in doubt.  By avoiding the transactional nexus issues, the Court also passed 
up an opportunity to clarify the relationship between the personal and trans-
actional nexus aspects going forward. 
As a result of all this vagueness and uncertainty, courts, states, and tax-
payers will have to navigate the crossroads at which Wayfair has placed the 
substantial nexus doctrine.  The dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard 
could remain vague and collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction 
standard, or it could strengthen into a coherent standard that protects inter-
state commerce in earnest from unduly burdensome state tax actions.  The 
former path could lead to uncertain and burdensome tax obligations for in-
terstate taxpayers, counselling in favor of the latter path.  As the next Part 
explains, a threshold nexus requirement has the unique ability to support the 
United States’ system of interstate commerce by protecting against unduly 
burdensome tax compliance costs.  Failing to realize this ability would leave 
interstate commerce exposed to harmful state taxes; to avoid this possibility, 
the next Part guides the substantial nexus doctrine towards a coherent stand-
ard by developing the compliance burden theory of dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus and the standard that follows from that theory. 
II.  SOUND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS 
As the discussion in Part I indicates, the dormant Commerce Clause’s 
substantial nexus requirement has generated much controversy and confusion 
over the course of its existence.  Much of the controversy stems from the 
Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clear purpose for the requirement, 143 
leaving people to question the role the requirement has in preventing state tax 
actions from placing undue burdens on interstate commerce.  Indeed, many 
commentators have questioned whether the nexus concept has any role to 
play in the dormant Commerce Clause context, or whether nexus is more 
appropriately considered only in the due process personal jurisdiction con-
text.144 
                                                        
 142.  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (approving the South Dakota law and describing how it 
eased compliance burdens on taxpayers); see also id. at 2093 (“The Quill majority expressed con-
cern that without the physical presence rule ‘a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce’ 
by subjecting retailers to tax-collection obligations in thousands of different taxing jurisdictions.  
But the administrative costs of compliance, especially in the modern economy with its Internet tech-
nology, are largely unrelated to whether a company happens to have a physical presence in a State.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992)). 
 143.  See supra Part I.  But see supra note 17 (observing that commentators have proposed the-
oretical justifications for the substantial nexus requirement). 
 144.  See sources cited supra note 42. 
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This Part develops a theory—the compliance burden theory—that ex-
plains why nexus does have an important role to play in the dormant Com-
merce Clause context.  To develop the compliance burden theory, this Part 
considers the types of burdens a state tax might impose on interstate com-
merce and the ability of a threshold nexus requirement to address those bur-
dens.  As the analysis demonstrates, such a requirement is uniquely situated 
to protect interstate commerce from undue burdens caused by tax compliance 
costs.145 
This Part then develops a coherent dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard by relying on the compliance burden theory.  This standard focuses 
on whether tax compliance costs would compel someone engaged in inter-
state commerce to avoid doing business in the taxing state.  The compliance 
burden theory and the nexus standard that follows demonstrate dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus doctrine can and should avoid collapsing into due 
process personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
A.  The Dormant Commerce Clause and Undue Burdens on Interstate 
Commerce 
One of the more important restraints on state actions, tax or otherwise, 
is the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  As explained by the Supreme 
Court, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exists to prevent the “eco-
nomic Balkanization” of the states by prohibiting state actions that discrimi-
nate against or unduly burden interstate commerce.146  The Court has found 
that facially discriminatory state actions are categorically unconstitutional 
under the dormant Commerce Clause,147 so the most challenging legal issues 
arise in assessing when a state action that is not facially discriminatory—like 
imposing a general sales tax—nevertheless places an undue burden on inter-
state commerce.  Generally, a balancing test—referred to as the “Pike bal-
ancing test”—is used to address these issues: a state action is deemed to un-
duly burden interstate commerce when the burdens placed on interstate 
commerce outweigh the state’s interest in taking the action.148 
                                                        
 145.  See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 497–503 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 146.  E.g., Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089, 2091; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 
U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
 147.  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (observing “a vir-
tually per se rule of invalidity” for laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce). 
 148.  The Supreme Court has adopted “a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regu-
lation under the Commerce Clause.”  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986).  When a regulatory measure “has only indirect effects on interstate 
commerce and regulates evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing analysis, looking to “whether 
the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the 
local benefits.”  Id. at 579 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
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However, the Pike balancing test has not found a clear home in the state 
tax jurisprudence despite the Court’s recognition that a tax levied on inter-
state commerce has the potential to unduly burden that commerce.149  Indeed, 
Chief Justice John Marshall famously described the power to tax as entailing 
“the power to destroy”; taken to an extreme, a state tax could destroy inter-
state commerce through death by taxation.150  The Pike balancing test’s ab-
sence from the state tax cases likely is a result of the difficulties in quantify-
ing a state’s significant interest151 in exercising the tax power,152 a power that 
often has been described as fundamental.153 
Deviating from the Pike balancing test, the modern state tax doctrine 
instead relies on the Complete Auto test—derived from the 1977 Complete 
Auto case—to guide the analysis of the burden that a state tax might impose 
on interstate commerce in a qualitative manner.154  In full, the Complete Auto 
test requires that a “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided 
by the State” before the dormant Commerce Clause is satisfied.155  This Ar-
ticle focuses on the nexus concept embedded in the first prong of the test, but 
                                                        
 149.  E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1992). 
 150.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (“That the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that 
there is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional 
measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme 
over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.”). 
 151.  E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981) (“[T]his Court has 
acknowledged that ‘a State has a significant interest in exacting from interstate commerce its fair 
share of the cost of state government.’” (quoting Washington Revenue Dep’t v. Ass’n. of Wash. 
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978))). 
 152.  Fatale, supra note 15, at 873–74 (detailing the difficulty of applying the Pike balancing test 
to tax matters); Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 109–10 (articulating the difficulty of measuring a 
state’s interest in imposing taxes). 
 153.  See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997) (“The 
power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist.”); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 
435, 444 (1940) (referring to taxation as “the most basic power of government”); State Bd. of Tax 
Comm’rs of Ind. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931) (“The power of taxation is fundamental to 
the very existence of the government of the States.”); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 
(1930) (“The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious necessity of all government, not to 
be restricted by mere legal fictions.”). 
 154.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018); see also Thimmesch, 
supra note 20, at 107–08 (“Pike balancing is the Court’s way of determining when state regulations, 
in the parlance of its precedential case, simply ‘go too far.’  That is where Pike seems to diverge 
from Complete Auto, because the Court does not exercise a similarly broad oversight function in its 
tax cases.  It does not strike down state taxes because they are too high or because they result in 
cumulative tax burdens.  Rather, states are free to tax as they see fit as long as their taxes are non-
discriminatory and are fairly apportioned.  The one exception, of course, is that states cannot go 
‘too far’ in who they impose those burdens on.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 155.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).  
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the other prongs become relevant when analyzing the role of a threshold 
nexus requirement in preventing undue burdens on interstate commerce. 
B.  The Compliance Burden Theory of Dormant Commerce Clause 
Nexus 
Broadly speaking, three aspects of a state tax can create burdens on in-
terstate commerce: the tax rate; the tax base; and the tax compliance costs.  
A tax rate that becomes too high, a tax base that is incorrectly measured, or 
tax compliance costs that become too heavy might lead to undue burdens.  As 
the following subsections demonstrate, the nexus concept—that threshold 
connection between the taxing state and the interstate commerce taxed—of-
fers weak protections against potential undue burdens resulting from tax rates 
and tax bases but offers strong protections against such burdens resulting 
from tax compliance costs.  Thus, protecting interstate commerce from the 
undue burdens of tax compliance costs should drive the dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus doctrine. 
1.  The Potential Undue Burdens of Too High Tax Rates 
When thinking of an unduly burdensome tax, one might first suspect 
that the tax rate is too high.  However, a high tax rate, if duly-enacted though 
a state’s legitimate political process, is not inherently problematic, as the Su-
preme Court has indicated.156  Because a state’s interest in exercising its tax 
power is strong and difficult to quantify, it is difficult to apply the traditional 
Pike balancing test to determine whether the tax unduly burdens interstate 
                                                        
 156.  See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994)  (“Nondiscriminatory 
measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects 
on interstate commerce, in part because ‘[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely af-
fected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981))).  Justice Ginsburg most re-
cently articulated a political process argument in a dissent in Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland 
v. Wynne, stating: 
  Residents, moreover, possess political means, not shared by outsiders, to ensure that 
the power to tax their income is not abused.  “It is not,” this Court has observed, “a pur-
pose of the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state taxes.”  The 
reason is evident.  Residents are “insider[s] who presumably [are] able to complain about 
and change the tax through the [State’s] political process.”  Nonresidents, by contrast, 
are not similarly positioned to “effec[t] legislative change.”  As Chief Justice Marshall, 
developer of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, reasoned: “In imposing a tax 
the legislature acts upon its constituents.  This is in general a sufficient security against 
erroneous and oppressive taxation.”  The “people of a State” can thus “res[t] confidently 
on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their repre-
sentative, to guard them against . . . abuse” of the “right of taxing themselves and their 
property.” 
135 S. Ct. 1787, 1814–15 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations omit-
ted) (first quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989); and then quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1818)); see also Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 
496. 
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commerce.157  However, the type of balancing that Pike demands—compar-
ing the state’s interest in acting with the burden placed on individuals—is 
unnecessary when the tax is self-imposed; the taxpayer-voters have decided 
the tax is worth imposing, presumptively making the burdens imposed not 
undue. 
Of course, the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with undue bur-
dens on interstate commerce.  This interstate commerce aspect introduces the 
possibility that the political process may fail to accurately balance the state’s 
interest and the burdens of the state tax; the state tax may fall on an out-of-
state taxpayer who is not involved in the state’s political process and thus not 
be self-imposed.158  Alternatively, the interstate income of state residents 
might be subject to higher tax rates than intrastate income.159  Interstate com-
merce may become unduly burdened as a result of either.160  These scenarios 
are not difficult to imagine; for example, Virginians might elect to impose a 
one hundred percent tax rate on the income of Marylanders earned in Vir-
ginia.  Marylanders would presumably stop their Virginia activities facing 
such a tax, and interstate commerce would have been impermissibly chilled.  
Alternatively, Virginians might impose a higher tax on income earned by 
Virginians in Maryland to encourage Virginians to work solely in Virginia. 
A threshold nexus requirement could address this problem, though not 
in a completely satisfying manner.  A nexus standard could protect any inter-
state taxpayer from a state tax until the taxpayer’s connection with the state 
is large enough that it would be allowed to vote or otherwise participate in 
the political system.161  Once the interstate taxpayer has a political voice in 
the taxing state, the political protections against high tax rates could be relied 
on. 
Difficulties of comprehensibly articulating such a standard aside,162 a 
major problem for relying on the nexus requirement in this way is that the 
interstate taxpayers’ political voice might not overcome that of a majority of 
intrastate taxpayers, threatening to expose the interstate commerce to higher 
                                                        
 157.  See supra note 152. 
 158.  See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200 (“However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is 
coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political processes can no 
longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would 
otherwise lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.”); see also Zelinsky, supra note 
17, at 51 (observing that “the temptation to tax nonvoters is politically irresistible”). 
 159.  See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1787. 
 160.  See id. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has not shied away from striking 
down or closely scrutinizing state efforts to tax residents at a higher rate for out-of-state activities 
than for in-state activities (or to exempt from taxation only in-state activities).”). 
 161.  See Zelinsky, supra note 17, at 3 (“From [a political process] vantage, the Commerce 
Clause concept of tax nexus is best understood as a rough, but serviceable, proxy for the taxpayer’s 
standing in the political process.”). 
 162.  See id. at 55–59 (addressing the difficulties of a political voice standard for substantial 
nexus). 
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tax rates.163  In the above example, native Virginians might easily drown out 
the political influence of Marylanders who have the ability to participate in 
Virginia’s political process.  Alternatively, Virginians working solely intra-
state could elect to tax other Virginians who work interstate at higher rates.  
Unless the dormant Commerce Clause were to require states to afford out-of-
staters or those working out-of-state more political influence than pure in-
staters—an absurd proposition—a nexus standard based on political voice 
would fail to effectively protect interstate commerce from too high tax rates. 
Therefore, to ensure interstate commerce is appropriately protected 
from unduly high tax rates, the in-state voters should be relied on to reach the 
appropriate balance.  This can be done by prohibiting interstate commerce 
from being taxed more heavily than intrastate commerce.  Such a rule would 
allow in-state voters to be relied on to prevent unduly burdensome tax rates 
from being imposed on both intrastate and interstate commerce,164 regardless 
of the connection the interstate commerce has with the state.  Local Virgini-
ans would be unable to subject Marylanders or interstate Virginians to higher 
taxes than the local Virginians are willing to bear. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the strength of such a non-discrimi-
nation rule in this context and has not sought to impose limits on the size of 
state tax rates on interstate commerce in the modern jurisprudence.165  In-
stead, the third prong of the Complete Auto test prevents states from specifi-
cally targeting interstate commerce for higher tax burdens by forbidding 
states from treating interstate commerce more harshly than intrastate com-
merce.166  Thus, a threshold nexus standard is neither necessary nor best 
suited to address the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of too 
high tax rates. 
2.  The Potential Undue Burdens of a Distorted Tax Base 
Continuing to think of unduly burdensome taxes, one might next suspect 
that a distorted tax base could create harmful results.  Although the in-state 
political process can be relied on to reach a constitutional tax rate on inter-
                                                        
 163.  See id. at 52–53 (discussing the “chief problem with this approach . . . that interstate tax-
payers’ political remedies do not always protect them from excessive tax burdens”). 
 164.  See supra note 156. 
 165.  In historical jurisprudence, all taxes on interstate commerce were forbidden at various 
times.  For descriptions of the evolution of the jurisprudence, see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–84 (1995); Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279–
87 (1977); see also POMP, supra note 70, at 1-1 to 1-21. 
 166.  E.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015) (“Under our 
precedents, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes States from ‘discriminat[ing] between trans-
actions on the basis of some interstate element.’  This means, among other things, that a State ‘may 
not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely 
within the State.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 318, 332 n.12 (1977); and then quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984))). 
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state commerce, that political process may fail when considering the con-
struction of the tax base.  The political process can ensure the same bases are 
subject to tax regardless of whether the bases are part of intrastate or inter-
state commerce, but the multijurisdictional nature of interstate commerce in-
troduces the complexity that the entire tax base may not be connected with 
the taxing state. 
A state tax might therefore burden interstate commerce by attributing 
more of the interstate tax base commerce to its jurisdiction than is appropri-
ate, effectively engaging in the taxation of extraterritorial activities.167  This 
sort of activity represents a potential indirect means of taxing interstate com-
merce more heavily than intrastate commerce and thus chilling the interstate 
commerce.  For instance, Arizona might impose an income tax which applies 
to all income earned in the state.  It is often difficult to source income to only 
one place;168 for example, the income a data hosting service earns performing 
services out of its California office for Arizona clients arguably has both Cal-
ifornia and Arizona sources.  If Arizona fully included any income that has 
at least a partial Arizona source in the state’s income tax base, that tax base 
would be overstated at the expense of interstate commerce. 
A threshold nexus requirement could be used to protect against this type 
of potentially burdensome action but only in a highly ineffective manner.  
The requirement could prevent a state from imposing tax on interstate com-
merce until such time as the interstate taxpayer or activity has such a large 
connection with the state that sourcing any amount of the activity taxed to 
the state would not be unduly burdensome.  For instance, suppose there is 
                                                        
 167.  See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184–85 (“The difficult question in this case is whether the 
tax is properly apportioned within the meaning of the second prong of Complete Auto’s test, ‘the 
central purpose [of which] is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate trans-
action.’  This principle of fair share is the lineal descendant of Western Live Stock’s prohibition of 
multiple taxation, which is threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the 
possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed: the portion of value by 
which one State exceeded its fair share would be taxed again by a State properly laying claim to it.” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260–61 
(1989))); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (“[W]e will strike 
down the application of an apportionment formula if the taxpayer can prove ‘by “clear and cogent 
evidence” that the income attributed to the State is in fact “out of all appropriate proportions to the 
business transacted . . . in that State,” or has “led to a grossly distorted result.”’ (alterations in orig-
inal) (citations omitted) (first quoting Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 
(1931), and then quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978))); Moorman Mfg. 
Co., 437 U.S. at 276–81 (addressing concerns that Iowa attributed too much of an interstate com-
pany’s income to the state through the use of a single sales factor apportionment formula). 
 168.  See, e.g., Catherine A. Battin et al., Demystifying the Sales Factor: Market-Based Sourc-
ing, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 403, 403 (2014) (“The key problem faced by most service providers is 
determining where the market for their services is located.  Depending on the state, the market may 
be where the benefit of the service is received by the customer, where the service is received, where 
the customer is located, or where the service is delivered.  Those varying interpretations of the 
market may produce dramatically different results and create complexities and uncertainties.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
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some tolerable margin of error for states in determining their share of the tax 
base such that one state might claim more of the base than it technically 
should—say the claimed tax base must be within ten percentage points of the 
“true” base.169  In such a case, the substantial nexus standard could protect 
against the undue burden of overstated tax bases by preventing a state from 
taxing interstate commerce until at least ninety percent of that commerce oc-
curred in the state (assuming the high end of the range of acceptable tax bases 
is one hundred percent of the tax base). 
This solution would be too restrictive on states by effectively protecting 
most interstate commerce from state taxation, a position the Supreme Court 
has rejected.170  The potential tax base problems are better solved through a 
system of apportionment—requiring the states to divide up interstate tax ba-
ses—or a system of tax prioritization171—ranking the authority of the states 
to impose tax on the interstate commerce.  Either system could ensure that 
no more than one hundred percent of the interstate commerce is subject to 
tax, though an apportionment system would be more respectful of each indi-
vidual states’ tax power by not conditioning any one state’s authority on an-
other’s. 
Indeed, to address these concerns, the Supreme Court has adopted an 
apportionment system.  The second prong of the Complete Auto test requires 
that any state tax on interstate commerce be fairly apportioned according to 
the amount of activity in the state.172  Therefore, in theory, a state should be 
unable to tax one hundred percent of an activity that takes place in more than 
one state; the state should only be allowed to impose tax on that portion of 
                                                        
 169.  See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184 (observing a deviation of “approximately 14%” 
would not violate the fair apportionment requirement whereas a deviation of “more than 250%” 
would).  Query how one would determine the appropriate baseline against which to make such a 
comparison; the Court has not provided clear guidance other than to say that using the accounting 
method of the taxpayer will not suffice on its own.  Id. at 182–84. 
 170.  See, e.g., D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30–31 (1988) (“Complete Auto 
abandoned the abstract notion that interstate commerce ‘itself’ cannot be taxed by the States.  We 
recognized that, with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share 
of state taxes.”); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975) (“It is a truism that the 
mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state 
taxation. ‘It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate com-
merce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the busi-
ness.’” (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938))); Nw. States 
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461–62 (1959) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the found-
ers did not intend to immunize [interstate] commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the 
state government in return for the benefits it derives from within the State.”). 
 171.  Justice Rutledge argued as early as 1944 that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
should be setting such rules of tax priority among the states.  See supra note 80. 
 172.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (“[W]e will sustain a tax against 
a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax . . . [2] is fairly apportioned . . . .’” (second alter-
ation in original)). 
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the activity that takes place in the state.173  In this way, interstate commerce 
that has no connection with the taxing state should be protected from the 
state’s tax; the in-state tax base would be nothing.174 
A state tax might also burden interstate commerce by measuring the tax 
base by something wholly unrelated to the activities in the state,175 another 
potential indirect means of taxing interstate commerce more heavily than in-
trastate commerce.  For example, Colorado could impose a “nature tax” on 
visitors to its state parks for the privilege of visiting those parks but measure 
the tax by the income of the taxpayer, which might create a tax inordinately 
large in relation to the taxpayer’s activities in the state. 
A threshold nexus requirement could protect against such harm by again 
requiring that the interstate commerce have such a large connection with the 
state that using any tax base would not be unduly burdensome, though such 
a threshold would likely be too restrictive on states.176  Instead, the political 
process protections discussed earlier should prevent the use of this tactic to 
target out-of-state taxpayers, and the anti-discrimination prong of the Com-
plete Auto test would adequately protect interstate commerce.177 
For its part, the state tax jurisprudence may have recognized the ability 
of the political process to protect against these kinds of distorted tax bases.  
Technically, the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test prohibits tax bases 
that are unrelated to the activity in the state, ensuring the state tax is fairly 
related to whatever is occurring in the state.178  However, the application of 
this prong is so forgiving to states—almost any tax base will be found to be 
                                                        
 173.  See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169 (“The first, and again obvious, component of fairness 
in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency—that is, the formula must 
be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary busi-
ness’ income being taxed.”).  In practice, the constitutional apportionment standards leave a lot of 
room for state-by-state interpretation, which has created a web of overlapping and underlapping 
rules that do not perfectly divide the tax base.  See State Taxation: The Role of Congress in Devel-
oping Apportionment Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2010) (statement of John A. Swain, Professor, 
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law); Cara Griffith, The Complexities of Ap-
portionment and the Question of Uniformity, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 725 (2010). 
 174.  The Due Process Clause also meaningfully restricts states’ ability to tax things outside of 
their territories by demanding that there be “some minimum connection” between the taxing state 
and the thing taxed.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 
340, 344–45 (1954)).  In this way, the Due Process Clause addresses concerns about extraterritorial 
state taxation.  See Holderness, supra note 13, at 402–04 (discussing prohibitions on extraterritorial 
state taxation). 
 175.  See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625–26 (1981). 
 176.  See supra note 170. 
 177.  See supra notes 156–166 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 626 (“[T]he fourth prong of the Complete Auto 
Transit test imposes the additional limitation that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related 
to the extent of the contact, since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may 
properly be made to bear a ‘just share of state tax burden.’” (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1983)). 
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fairly related to whatever is occurring in the state—that it effectively passes 
the question to the political process.179 
Thus, a threshold nexus standard is also ill-suited and unnecessary to 
address the potential undue burdens on interstate commerce of distorted tax 
bases. 
3.  The Potential Undue Burdens of Tax Compliance Costs 
Finally, one might suspect that a tax could become unduly burdensome 
if the costs to comply with the tax were too large.  Tax compliance costs 
include things such as the labor required to ensure taxes are correctly paid, 
the capital investments in software and computing capacity to run tax com-
pliance systems, the ability to access funds to pay the tax, and—im-
portantly—the costs and risks associated with handling audits by state reve-
nue departments.180  Significantly, compliance costs tend to be relatively flat; 
they are roughly as burdensome on the first bit of activity taxed as they are 
on the last.181 
                                                        
 179.  See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995) (“The fair rela-
tion prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer 
on account of the activity being taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs 
created by the taxed activity.  If the event is taxable, the proceeds from the tax may ordinarily be 
used for purposes unrelated to the taxable event.”); Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 628 (ana-
lyzing a state tax under the forth prong of the Complete Auto test and observing that “questions 
about the appropriate level of state taxes must be resolved through the political process”); see also 
Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause: 
Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 196, 205 
(2007) (“Courts have heretofore been so reluctant to [apply] the ‘fairly related’ prong of Complete 
Auto [that it] has become a dead letter.”). 
 180.  See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-114 SALES TAXES: STATES COULD 
GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY, BUT BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE 
COMPLIANCE COSTS, 15–27 (2017) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (detailing compliance costs for 
sales and use tax collection); Holderness, supra note 17, at 331; Ralph B. Tower, Back to the Fu-
ture? The Post-Wayfair Consumer Use Tax, 89 ST. TAX NOTES 879 (2018) (detailing the challenges 
of use tax compliance under different regimes).  The costs of addressing the risk of inadvertent non-
compliance and addressing potential non-compliance on audit tend to multiply the otherwise rela-
tively straightforward compliance costs.  See GAO REPORT, supra, at 20–27; Julia S. Bragg & Rob-
ert J. Tuinstra, Jr., Managing State and Local Tax Risks, 57 ST. TAX NOTES 361 (2010) (detailing 
the various risks for taxpayers associated with state and local tax compliance); Gamage & Heckman, 
supra note 17, at 510 (“[C]ompensation for compliance costs must include compensation for intan-
gible costs such as executives’ time and the risk of being subject to penalties for inadvertent non-
compliance.”). 
 181.  See DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM F. FOX, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF 
INTERNET SALES TAXATION AND THE SMALL SELLER EXEMPTION 35–36 (2013) (surveying studies 
of compliance costs and observing, “These findings indicate that there may be some economies of 
scale in terms of compliance costs, echoing Bradford’s (2004) survey of the literature.  As Bradford 
notes, however, the apparent economies of scale may be based on the relatively fixed nature of 
compliance costs.”); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 180, at 15–27; Gamage & Heckman, supra 
note 17, at 504–09 (analyzing hypothetical tax compliance costs based on reports of compliance 
costs and observing that costs are “much higher as a percentage of sales for small vendors than for 
large vendors,” demonstrating that such costs rise more slowly than the benefits of sales activity); 
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As an example of how tax compliance costs might unduly burden inter-
state commerce, suppose it costs a New York vendor $475 for compliance 
software that enables it to correctly collect and remit Massachusetts sales tax.  
If the New York vendor makes only $50 per sale into Massachusetts, it would 
presumably forgo making any sales into the state until it makes at least ten 
sales, thereby making enough profit to cover its compliance costs.  The com-
pliance costs would chill the New York vendor’s willingness to engage in 
interstate commerce until the vendor’s activity in the state is profitable 
enough to cover the compliance costs.  Here, a threshold nexus requirement 
shines and other dormant Commerce Clause guardrails falter. 
A threshold nexus requirement can protect against the potential undue 
burden of tax compliance costs on interstate commerce by ensuring a state 
cannot impose tax (and the associated compliance costs) until the commerce 
has enough of a connection with the state such that the benefit of that con-
nection to the taxpayer outweighs the burden of the compliance costs.  In 
short, nexus with the taxing state would not exist until the interstate taxpayer 
has made enough money to cover the compliance costs of the state tax sys-
tem.  In the above example, the nexus requirement could protect the New 
York vendor’s first nine sales from Massachusetts sales tax. In this way, the 
nexus requirement can ensure that interstate commerce is not exposed to un-
duly burdensome tax compliance costs, costs that would chill the interstate 
commerce. 
Because of the flat nature of compliance costs,182 other dormant Com-
merce Clause protections are ill-suited to address the burden of tax compli-
ance costs as they focus on the structure and scope of the tax itself.  An ap-
portionment system would technically assign a small portion of interstate 
activity to a state if there is only a tiny amount of the activity occurring in the 
state, which would require the taxpayer to bear full compliance costs to pay 
a small amount of tax.  Those costs cannot be apportioned like the tax base; 
they must be borne in full by someone.  The anti-discrimination principle 
requires only that the state not treat interstate commerce more harshly than 
intrastate commerce.  If a state chooses, through its political system, to im-
pose taxes with high compliance costs on intrastate commerce, then the prong 
would not prevent the imposition of those same costs on interstate com-
merce.183  Thus, a threshold nexus requirement is uniquely situated to address 
the potential burden of tax compliance costs on interstate commerce. 
                                                        
Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 111 (“[A] firm’s costs will likely be highest in its first year of oper-
ating in a state, but they should be reduced thereafter.  A firm utilizing software to manage many of 
these burdens might find their costs to be more stable.”). 
 182.  See supra note 181. 
 183.  The anti-discrimination prong does not work in reverse; it does not demand that intrastate 
commerce be treated the same as interstate commerce.  Intrastate commerce is the sole domain of 
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C.  The Compliance Burden Theory and Cumulative Tax Burdens 
The above analysis leads to the compliance burden theory of dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus: the nexus requirement should exist to prevent un-
duly burdensome tax compliance costs from being placed on interstate com-
merce.  The Supreme Court has never explicitly offered this justification for 
its articulated “substantial nexus” requirement, but as discussed, its decisions 
addressing the personal nexus requirement have threads of concerns about 
tax compliance costs.184  For example, in Wayfair, the Court discussed how 
the physical presence rule failed to protect small vendors from burdensome 
“administrative costs of compliance.”185 
Recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement is 
uniquely situated to protect against unduly burdensome tax compliance costs 
raises an important question: should each state’s tax compliance costs be con-
sidered in isolation, or should the nexus requirement focus on the cumulative 
compliance costs borne by a multistate taxpayer?186  Because the dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence exists to prevent individual states from act-
ing to unduly burden interstate commerce, it is not adequately equipped to 
address the cumulative effects of all states’ actions.  Addressing those cumu-
lative effects instead demands political balancing and tradeoffs that Congress 
has been tasked with under its Commerce Clause authority.187  Simply put, 
in the absence of Congressional action, individual states’ interests in exercis-
ing their tax powers over interstate commerce are not dependent on what 
other states do.  As such, the compliance costs of each tax regime must be 
viewed in isolation. 
The state taxation jurisprudence has implicitly recognized this conclu-
sion.  The Supreme Court has been loath to invalidate one state’s tax action 
under the dormant Commerce Clause when an interstate taxpayer suffers 
from alleged undue burdens from the accumulation of many states’ tax re-
gimes; instead, the Court has demanded clear proof that the challenged tax 
regime, not the other states’, is the actual source of the undue burdens, a 
                                                        
the taxing state, and federal law will not upset the state’s rules for intrastate commerce in this con-
text.  See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989) (“It is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause 
to protect state residents from their own state taxes.”).  
 184.  See supra Section I.A.1. 
 185.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018). 
 186.  This question has long lingered in the substantial nexus area.  For example, in their pre-
Wayfair analysis of the substantial nexus requirement, Professors Gamage and Heckman considered 
the burdens on interstate commerce created by aggregate tax compliance costs from multiple juris-
dictions.  See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 500–01.  
 187.  See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967) (“The 
very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifia-
ble local entanglements.  Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the 
power of regulation and control.”). 
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nearly impossible task in practice.188  Additionally, the Quill Court failed to 
adopt Justice Rutledge’s position that the dormant Commerce Clause should 
be setting rules of tax priority between taxing states that have due process 
nexus with the interstate commerce taxed, despite the fact that the Court 
adopted Justice Rutledge’s suggested split of the Due Process Clause and 
dormant Commerce Clause analyses of state tax actions.189  Setting rules of 
tax priority would have accounted for cumulative tax burdens; instead, the 
Quill Court left the issue in Congress’ hands.190  Until Congress says other-
wise, each individual state’s tax power is not dependent on any other state’s 
actions. 
It is true that Quill and Bellas Hess both expressed concern about the 
potential of cumulative tax burdens on interstate taxpayers to support the use 
of the physical presence rule for personal nexus.191  However, Wayfair should 
be read to dismiss those concerns in its focus on the taxpayer’s connection 
with the taxing jurisdiction alone.  Indeed, the Wayfair Court specifically ad-
dressed those concerns and claimed that “[o]ther aspects of the Court’s doc-
trine can better and more accurately address any potential [cumulative] bur-
dens on interstate commerce, whether or not Quill’s physical presence rule is 
satisfied.”192 
Although the Court did not expand on what those other aspects might 
be, to the extent the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence does anything 
to address cumulative tax burdens on interstate commerce, it does so mainly 
through the apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test.193  In theory, 
apportionment ensures that no cumulative tax burdens exist on interstate 
commerce by preventing states from taxing more than their fair share of the 
multistate tax base.194  Therefore, courts should address the potential impact 
                                                        
 188.  See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192–93 (1983) (“If Cali-
fornia’s method of formula apportionment ‘inevitably’ led to double taxation, that might be reason 
enough to render it suspect.  But since it does not, it would be perverse, simply for the sake of 
avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes 
results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double 
taxation.” (citation omitted)); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276–81 (1978) (refusing to 
hold Iowa’s apportionment formula unconstitutional because it differed from other states’ formulas 
and may have contributed to cumulative tax burdens on interstate commerce). 
 189.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (“Heeding Justice Rutledge’s coun-
sel, we consider each constitutional limit in turn.”). 
 190.  Cf. id. at 318 (“[The Commerce Clause] aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact 
that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also 
one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.  No matter how we evaluate the burdens that 
use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 191.  See supra notes 56 and 62. 
 192.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018). 
 193.  See supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (explaining that 
the apportionment standard looks “to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of 
value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State” and “the threat of real 
   
38 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:1 
of cumulative tax burdens on interstate commerce after dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus exists with the taxing state—that is to say, after establishing 
that the tax compliance costs imposed by the taxing state are not unduly bur-
densome on interstate commerce. 
In sum, the compliance burden theory holds that a threshold nexus in-
quiry for state tax power is appropriate under the dormant Commerce Clause 
because such an inquiry is uniquely capable of protecting interstate com-
merce from the undue burdens of state tax compliance costs.  The theory fo-
cuses on individual state tax burdens; it is not concerned with the cumulative 
tax compliance costs to which a multistate taxpayer might be subjected.  Re-
lying on these conclusions, the next Section develops a theoretically-sound 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard. 
D.  A Theoretically Sound Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus Standard 
Understanding the compliance burden theory allows for the develop-
ment of a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard.  
The nexus standard must take the costs associated with tax compliance into 
account, as well as the benefits the taxpayer receives from engaging in inter-
state commerce in the taxing state.  This standard taps into many of the con-
cerns expressed by the Wayfair Court and ensures that those concerns drive 
the nexus analysis. 
1.  A Post-Wayfair Nexus Standard 
The fundamental nature of the state tax power indicates that the states 
should have a strong interest in efficient and effective tax administration,195 
which may demand that taxpayers bear many of the costs of tax compliance.  
However, imposing those costs on interstate commerce threatens to inappro-
priately chill that commerce.196  Therefore, the standard for dormant Com-
merce Clause nexus should follow the greater dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine and engage in balancing similar to the Pike balancing test to deter-
mine when the state’s interest in imposing tax compliance costs is unduly 
burdensome on interstate commerce.197  Traditional Pike balancing may be 
difficult in the case of evaluating the state tax burden itself,198 but the balanc-
ing becomes more straightforward when examining the tax compliance costs. 
                                                        
multiple taxation (though not by literally identical statutes) may indicate a State’s impermissible 
overreaching”); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (“The first, 
and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called 
internal consistency—that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would 
result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.”). 
 195.  See supra note 153. 
 196.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
 197.  See supra note 148. 
 198.  See supra note 154. 
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The nexus standard that follows from the compliance burden theory pro-
vides that dormant Commerce Clause nexus exists when the benefits the tax-
payer receives from conducting interstate commerce in the state exceed the 
tax compliance costs imposed on the taxpayer.  Simply put, if the interstate 
commerce is profitable despite the tax compliance costs,199 then the nexus 
standard should be satisfied.  If not, dormant Commerce Clause nexus should 
not be found. This standard can be expressed formulaically as: 
Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus ⇔ Benefit to Taxpayer of Activity 
in State > Taxpayer Compliance Costs 
This standard sends a clear message to states that compliance costs are 
important.  That said, the standard should not be terribly imposing on states.  
Reasonable minds can disagree on how much the benefit to the taxpayer 
should exceed the tax compliance costs, but at a minimum that benefit should 
equal the costs to avoid the complete interruption of interstate commerce.  In 
any event, because tax compliance costs are relatively flat costs to the tax-
payer, dormant Commerce Clause nexus concerns should quickly fade away 
as the interstate taxpayer increases its beneficial activities in the state. 
The proposed nexus standard does not separate out personal nexus and 
transactional nexus concerns, at least not directly.  Instead, it focuses on the 
compliance costs placed on the taxpayer as they relate to the interstate activ-
ity in the taxing state.  The reason for this approach is that the two concerns 
become significantly intertwined under the compliance burden theory.  The 
burden of tax compliance costs must fall to a taxpayer, so personal nexus may 
seem the more relevant concern.  If the taxpayer’s presence in the state is not 
beneficial enough to justify taking on the burden of those costs, dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus does not exist. 
However, the relevant presence of the taxpayer is based on the activities 
being conducted in and taxed by the state.  Transactional nexus turns out to 
be the most pertinent concern because the tax compliance costs are specific 
to the activity taxed.  If those compliance costs would drive the taxpayer to 
stop that activity in the state, dormant Commerce Clause nexus is not estab-
lished.  Because of the prominence of the transactional nexus aspect under 
the compliance burden theory, a coherent dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard can develop in the jurisprudence even if the standard for personal 
nexus remains vague or collapses into the due process personal jurisdiction 
                                                        
 199.  As Professors Gamage and Heckman observed before the Wayfair case, “Being exempt 
from state sales and use taxes is sufficiently important to major e-commerce vendors such as Ama-
zon that these vendors can be expected to end most affiliations that would deem them to have a 
physical presence within key customer states.” Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 485. This 
observation recognizes that remote vendors were offered a significant competitive advantage over 
local vendors under the physical presence rule regime.  The proposal in this Article would only 
permit remote vendors to avoid tax collection when the costs of doing so would be prohibitively 
expensive for the taxpayer.  Id. 
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standard.200  All that is needed is the development of the transactional nexus 
standard in line with the proposed standard. 
In short, a theoretically-sound dormant Commerce Clause nexus stand-
ard must consider the specific interstate activity taxed and how tax compli-
ance costs burden that activity.  Personal nexus should exist when transac-
tional nexus exists, and even if other activities could establish personal 
nexus,201 transactional nexus requires that each activity taxed be analyzed 
separately.  The Court was correct to frame the first prong of the Complete 
Auto test in terms of transactional nexus,202 and the Quill Court’s focus on 
personal nexus was unnecessary.203 
2.  Assessing the Proposed Nexus Standard 
In addition to fulfilling the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause by 
protecting interstate commerce from unduly burdensome tax compliance 
costs, the proposed nexus standard would prove beneficial in a number of 
ways.  First, by using a more focused dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard, the analysis of state tax jurisdiction can appropriately adapt to 
changing economies, business practices, and tax systems.  For example, if 
interstate services are more profitable than interstate sales of consumer 
goods, then a smaller connection with the services would be necessary to 
overcome the burden of tax compliance costs.  If businesses become more 
adept at complying with complex tax systems, again, a smaller connection 
                                                        
 200.  Cf. Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 116 (“The Court’s best option in Wayfair is to repeal the 
physical-presence rule and to not replace it.”).  Many commentators have argued that it would be 
appropriate for the personal nexus standard to collapse into the due process nexus standard.  See 
source cited supra note 42. 
 201.  Certain case law indicates that the personal nexus and transactional nexus inquiries may be 
totally separate from each other.  See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 
551, 561 (1977) (“[T]he relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an 
out-of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax relates 
to the seller’s activities carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts demonstrate ‘some 
definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 
(1954))).  If personal nexus continues to evolve as a separate line of doctrine from transactional 
nexus, then it would be possible for a taxpayer to have nexus with the state but for the activity taxed 
not to have a connection with the state.  For example, an online bookseller could have its headquar-
ters in Washington State, establishing personal nexus, yet the transactional nexus doctrine would 
prevent Washington State from taxing the bookseller’s sales made at its retail store in New York. 
 202.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (laying out the Complete Auto 
test as “we will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied 
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the 
State.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 279 (1977))). 
 203.  Cf. Thimmesch, supra note 42, at 188–91 (2012) (discussing the “[g]ratuitous [e]levation 
of the Commerce Clause over the Due Process Clause”). 
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with taxing states would be necessary.  As tax systems simplify, their com-
pliance costs fall, also requiring smaller connections. 
Second, the proposed standard would allow states the flexibility to ex-
pand their tax jurisdiction by absorbing the compliance costs of their tax sys-
tems.204  The idea of states absorbing the compliance costs of their tax sys-
tems may seem fanciful at first glance, but states already do this to varying 
degrees.  For example, many states provide “vendor discounts” to vendors 
that collect sales and use taxes, whereby the vendor is permitted to retain a 
percentage of the taxes collected in order to offset the administrative burden 
of collecting and remitting.205  Additionally, member states of the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement provide free compliance software to cer-
tain vendors.206 
Third, the proposed nexus standard would also bring the tax jurispru-
dence more in line with other areas of dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence,207 reducing variation between different areas of law.208  Outside of the 
state tax arena, the Pike balancing test is used to resolve conflicts between 
states and multijurisdictional people and activities.209  Although, in practice, 
the Pike balancing test is highly deferential to states,210 the test seeks to bal-
ance the costs imposed by the state on interstate commerce against the state’s 
                                                        
 204.  Pre-Wayfair, Professors Gamage and Heckman proposed allowing states to move past the 
physical presence rule if they fully absorbed the compliance costs of their tax systems.  See Gamage 
& Heckman, supra note 17, at 503–12. 
 205.  For a list of states providing vendor discounts, see FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, STATE SALES 
TAX RATES AND VENDOR DISCOUNTS (2019), https://www.taxadmin.org/assets/docs/Re-
search/Rates/vendors.pdf. 
 206.  See Certified Service Providers About, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, 
INC., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/certified-service-providers/certified-service-providers-
about (last visited June 4, 2019). 
 207.  See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 91 TEMPLE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the state tax dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is well on 
its way to convening with the non-tax dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and that that com-
ing together should be formally completed). 
 208.  See Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 116, 120–21; Hayes Holderness, The Workability of Pike 
Balancing for State and Local Tax Collection Obligations, SURLY SUBGROUP (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/W752-J4AE.  But see Fatale, supra note 15, at 872 (claiming that “the Court has 
been retreating from Pike for several decades, even in the regulatory context from which that stand-
ard derives”); Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 15, at 292 (“[I]t has been argued that the Court 
has implicitly repudiated a Pike balancing analysis in dormant commerce clause cases . . . .”). 
 209.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91 (2018). 
 210.  See Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 15, at 292; Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 108 (“The 
Court has not struck down a state statute applying [Pike] balancing since the 1980s.  The Roberts 
Court has generally been unwilling to even engage in balancing.” (footnote omitted)). 
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interest in acting,211 as would the proposed dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
standard.212 
This is not to claim that finding that balance will not present challenges.  
If there was value to the physical presence rule, it was the value that comes 
with generally applicable bright-line rules; they are typically easier to apply 
than more fluid standards.213  A primary criticism of the proposed nexus 
standard might be that it would require intensive evidence gathering and 
complicated calculations to determine when tax compliance costs become too 
burdensome.214  Indeed, some commentators argue that the application of a 
balancing test in this context is prohibitively difficult.215  However, these ar-
guments are based on the difficulty of sorting out the cumulative burdens that 
tax compliance costs from multiple jurisdictions might place on interstate 
commerce; admittedly, teasing out each jurisdiction’s contribution to the cu-
mulative burden would be a prohibitively difficult task.216 
As discussed though, the compliance burden theory instructs that the 
dormant Commerce Clause nexus standard must focus on the compliance 
costs imposed by each taxing jurisdiction in isolation, not in aggregate. 217  
This focus simplifies the balancing analysis: compliance costs and taxpayer 
benefits are easier to calculate when only considering one taxing jurisdiction 
at a time.  Taxpayers should be able to show fairly accurately their anticipated 
costs of compliance with the individual state tax regime and the expected 
profitability of their activities in the taxing state. 
Even so, as a practical matter, the proposed standard would likely lead 
to lawmakers and taxpayers resorting to proxies such as the average profit 
margin of the particular activity taxed to simplify the analysis, forsaking a 
                                                        
 211.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 467 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) 
(observing that when a regulatory measure “has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and 
regulates evenhandedly,” the Court applies a balancing analysis, looking to “whether the State’s 
interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local ben-
efits” (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))). 
 212.  Professor Thimmesch argues that the substantial nexus concept generally should be under-
stood to serve the same function as Pike balancing.  See Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 106–08. 
 213.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (“Like other bright-line tests, 
the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges . . . . This artificiality, however, is more than offset 
by the benefits of a clear rule.  Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state 
authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those 
taxes.” (citations omitted)). 
 214.  See Fatale, supra note 15, at 873–74 (detailing the difficulty of applying the Pike balancing 
test to tax matters); Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 109–12 (discussing the difficulties of a balancing 
test as a substantial nexus standard). 
 215.  See, e.g., Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 512–13.  In Professors Gamage and Heck-
man’s view, the solution to the difficulty of balancing in this context is to only find substantial nexus 
in those taxing jurisdictions that fully absorb the tax compliance costs imposed on interstate com-
merce.  Id. at 506–07, 513. 
 216.  See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 217.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
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truly pure application of the standard.218  Such proxies would provide clarity 
and simplicity generally, and the standard would serve as a safety valve for 
seriously aggrieved taxpayers wishing to bring individual challenges to nexus 
determinations. 
Such challenges could be costly for states and taxpayers but should be 
rare.  Given the low hurdle the proposed nexus standard should present, tax-
payers should only raise challenges when they have clear and compelling 
evidence of their compliance costs and benefits, and states could adopt con-
servative proxies to head off most challenges.  States could also avoid placing 
tax obligations on people not directly connected to the activity taxed because 
such obligations are more difficult to comply with than obligations placed on 
people directly connected with the activity taxed.219  Finally, states that wish 
to avoid dormant Commerce Clause nexus controversies could always sim-
plify their taxes and assume the compliance costs associated with them.220  In 
other words, the states would control their dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
destinies under the proposed standard. 
Although the standard is proposed in a neutral effort to bring clarity and 
reason to the dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement, the standard 
might be criticized as promoting a pro-state or anti-taxpayer agenda.  This 
criticism fails to consider whether the pre-Wayfair status quo struck an ap-
propriate balance between states and taxpayers.  The pre-Wayfair personal 
nexus rules were a thorn in most states’ sides, as the multitude of efforts to 
undermine the rules demonstrate.221  The traditional transactional nexus rules 
impose unnecessarily formalistic restrictions on certain state tax actions. 222  
Loosening these rules in an effort to more accurately track whether state tax 
systems place undue burdens on interstate commerce is likely to broaden 
                                                        
 218.  These sorts of administrative shortcuts are common in state and local tax jurisprudence, as 
the cost of arriving at absolutely accurate measures is often prohibitive.  For example, the appor-
tionment formulas states use to meet the fair apportionment requirement of the Complete Auto test 
are recognized not to be absolutely accurate; instead the formulas rely on measures like a taxpayer’s 
property, payroll, and sales in the taxing state to reasonably approximate the taxpayer’s taxable 
activity (i.e., income) in the state.  See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 
170 (1983) (observing that the fair apportionment prong would be violated only if “the income 
attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted . . . in 
that State,’” before observing that the three-factor property, payroll, and sales formula had “met our 
approval, [and had] become . . . something of a benchmark against which other apportionment for-
mulas are judged’” (quoting Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931))).  
The Container Corp. Court indicated that a deviation from the absolutely accurate tax base of “ap-
proximately 14%” would not be “out of all appropriate proportion” whereas a deviation of “more 
than 250%” would be.  Id. at 181, 184. 
 219.  See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 503–12 (discussing this option and how states 
might assume tax compliance costs). 
 221.  See Holderness, supra note 13, at 414–19 (surveying efforts to overturn the physical pres-
ence rule). 
 222.  See supra Section I.A.2. 
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state tax authority.223  But according to the compliance burden theory, that 
authority should have been broader all along; prior doctrine was inappropri-
ately anti-state, and cleaning up the doctrine would place taxpayers and states 
in a sounder balance. 
In sum, the compliance burden theory underlying the dormant Com-
merce Clause nexus requirement leads to fairly narrow protections against 
undue burdens on interstate commerce.224  Properly understood, the dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement simply carves out an amount of inter-
state activity that may cross a state’s line and not be subject to the state’s 
taxing power: that amount of interstate activity that would not continue if the 
taxpayer were made to bear the costs of tax compliance.  Adopting such a 
standard would bring clarity to a murky area of law and allow for the appro-
priate amount of flexibility needed for state taxes to adapt to changing tax 
and business practices over time. 
III.  BRINGING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NEXUS DOCTRINE IN LINE 
WITH THEORY 
The crossroads created by the Wayfair decision offers the opportunity 
to clarify and stabilize the protections of the dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus requirement.  Failing to do so, say by allowing the nexus standard to 
completely collapse into the due process personal jurisdiction standard, 
would open the door to unprincipled expansions of state tax power and un-
certain tax obligations that may burden interstate commerce.  Such a failure 
may particularly burden the activities of small businesses and of entities that 
facilitate the commerce of others, such as online marketplaces similar to Am-
azon Marketplace, payment intermediaries like MasterCard, and common 
carriers such as FedEx. 
This Part details how the compliance burden theory and the proposed 
nexus standard can be unambiguously incorporated into existing substantial 
nexus doctrine by focusing on the resolution of three post-Wayfair issues that 
may be soon litigated.  Though the term “substantial nexus” may be trouble-
some in its current state,225 it does offer an expedient way to establish the 
protections of the proposed standard in the case law.  Courts and state tax 
lawyers have been using the term for decades, and the Supreme Court seems 
unwilling to completely abandon it, as Wayfair demonstrates.  Rather than let 
it fester in limbo, “substantial nexus” should be infused with meaning.  That 
                                                        
 223.  See Thimmesch, supra note 20, at 117–19 (discussing the effects of loosening the substan-
tial nexus standards). 
 224.  This standard achieves goals proposed by economists for appropriate nexus standards. See 
Charles E. McLure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes—And the Nuttiness of Responses 
Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES  841, 845 (2002) (“Nexus (duty to collect tax) should depend on having 
either a substantial physical presence or a non-de minimis amount of sales in a state . . . .”). 
 225.  See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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said, the proposed standard need not find a home in the “substantial nexus” 
term; if that term were abandoned, there would still be a need to evaluate the 
burden tax compliance costs place on the interstate taxpayer. 
The three post-Wayfair issues considered below include the constitu-
tionality of imposing sales and use tax collection obligations on someone 
other than the vendor or the customer, the vitality of the formalism of the 
traditional transactional nexus doctrine, and the necessity of substantial nexus 
at both the state and local level when local taxes are imposed.  The key to 
appropriately developing the substantial nexus doctrine through these issues 
is to recognize the prominence of transactional nexus in the analysis and to 
adopt a coherent transactional nexus standard, regardless of how Wayfair’s 
“substantial privilege of carrying on business”226 personal nexus standard is 
interpreted. 
A.  Nexus Between Taxpayer and Activity Taxed: The Case of 
Marketplace Collection Obligations 
South Dakota’s win in Wayfair has predictably been embraced by the 
states, as demonstrated by a rush of legislative activity to align statutory per-
sonal nexus rules with the decision.227  Many states (including South Dakota) 
are going further than the original South Dakota model, which requires ven-
dors who collected gross receipts of more than $100,000 from sales to South 
Dakotans or who made more than 200 individual sales to South Dakotans in 
the prior year to collect the state’s sales tax.228 These states are extending tax 
collection obligations to marketplaces that facilitate sales between vendors 
and customers, like Amazon Marketplace, eBay, and Etsy.229  These laws 
cover entities that allow third-party vendors to use their platform to reach 
customers. 
                                                        
 226.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 227.  See Roxanne Bland, South Dakota v. Wayfair: The Fallout, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 621, 621 
(2018) (“After the U.S. Supreme Court’s June ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair jettisoned the rule 
equating physical presence with substantial nexus for purposes of requiring remote vendors selling 
into a state to collect that state’s sales tax, many sales tax states rushed to draft new economic nexus 
standards to drop into their tax codes.” (footnote omitted)); Pomp, supra note 126 (detailing states’ 
post-Wayfair legislative efforts). 
 228.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018). 
 229.  See, e.g., H.R. 470, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2018); S. 417, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Conn. 2018); S. 2417, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018); H.R. 366, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); H.R. 1019, 56th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Okla. 2018); S. 2, 2018 
Legis. Assemb., 93d Spec. Sess. (S.D. 2018); H.R. 2163, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); H.R. 
1, 90th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2017); H.R. 542, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); 
H.R. 5175, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2017); see also TOMMY HOYT, ET AL., 
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, REPORT OF WAYFAIR IMPLEMENTATION & MARKETPLACE 
FACILITATOR WORK GROUP 4 (2018), https://perma.cc/UHQ4-TXK7 [hereinafter, MTC, WHITE 
PAPER]; Jad Chamseddine, 2019: The Year of Marketplace Legislation, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 1096, 
1096 (2018); Lauren Loricchio, States Want Marketplace Facilitators to Collect Tax for Small 
Sellers, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 749, 749 (2018); Shanske et al., supra note 15, at 112. 
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These marketplace collection laws often place a tax collection obliga-
tion on the marketplace once sales made through its platform pass the same 
thresholds that apply to the individual vendors.230  Such an obligation can 
attach on a collective basis, so once enough sales are made on the platform, 
regardless of who the vendor is, the marketplace becomes responsible for tax 
collection.  For example, South Dakota’s marketplace collection law requires 
the marketplace to collect the state’s sales tax if the marketplace “[f]acilitates 
the sales of two or more marketplace sellers that, when the sales are com-
bined, are subject to [the South Dakota law at issue in Wayfair], even if the 
marketplace sellers are not separately or individually subject to [that law].”231 
A clear policy behind these marketplace collection laws is to push tax 
collection obligations to the most consolidated levels possible, on the belief 
that economies of scale at such levels will smooth the collection of taxes.232  
One marketplace could collect and remit taxes instead of thousands of indi-
vidual vendors.  In theory, this state of affairs could ease the administrative 
burden on a state to receive taxes collected and to audit tax collectors.233  In 
addition, the laws will predictably expand the number of sales on which tax 
is collected because the marketplaces will be collecting tax on sales made by 
vendors who are individually not subject to collection obligations.234  As oth-
ers note, this expansion increases fairness of treatment between vendors;235 
the states also figure to collect more taxes through these laws.236  It is not 
difficult to imagine states playing with the idea of extending these types of 
laws to cover additional entities that facilitate the commerce of others, such 
as payment intermediaries and common carriers.237 
                                                        
 230.  E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-65-5. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  See MTC, WHITE PAPER, supra note 229, at 3 (“In order to increase sales/use tax collection 
compliance levels, several states are imposing requirements on marketplace facilitators to collect 
and remit the sales/use tax on their marketplace sales.”); Chamseddine, supra note 229, at 1096 
(“The trend is happening mainly because it is more fruitful for states to require collection by mar-
ketplace providers. ‘It makes a lot more sense for states to have marketplace platforms or facilitators 
registered and collecting rather than having to deal with hundreds or thousands of marketplace 
sellers individually,’ said Marshall Stranburg, deputy executive director of the Multistate Tax Com-
mission.”). 
 233.  See MTC, WHITE PAPER, supra note 229, at 3; Chamseddine, supra note 229, at 1096. 
 234.  See Loricchio, supra note 229, at 749. 
 235.  Shanske et al., supra note 15, at 112. 
 236.  Chamseddine, supra note 229, at 1096 (“States that don’t expand their remote sales tax 
collection requirements to marketplaces could ‘miss out on a huge chunk’ of revenue, according to 
Richard Cram, also of the MTC.”). 
 237.  C.f. Rifat Azam & Orly Mazur, Cloudy with a Chance of Taxation, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 500 
(2019) (arguing for requiring payment intermediaries to collect excise taxes on cloud computing 
transactions that they facilitate). 
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Given the loosening of the personal nexus standard in Wayfair, these 
marketplace collection laws may pass constitutional muster,238 but they 
should not be guaranteed success given the compliance costs they will place 
on the marketplaces and the indirect benefits the marketplaces may receive 
from the taxing states.  Take the example of Etsy, which vendors located 
around the country use to connect with customers.239  Assume there are one 
hundred vendors using Etsy that sell into South Dakota and their sales col-
lectively satisfy the state’s statutory personal nexus rule.  South Dakota’s law 
would require Etsy to collect the sales taxes imposed on the transactions that 
occur on its platform as long as the constitutional substantial nexus standard 
is met with respect to Etsy.240 
Current personal nexus doctrine appears not to obstruct South Dakota’s 
efforts significantly.  If Etsy is purposefully exploiting the state’s market-
place, say by supporting vendors in the state or selling into the state and de-
riving income therefrom, then it will have exposed itself to personal nexus 
with the state.241  A court might follow Wayfair’s lead and declare personal 
nexus to exist because it thinks Etsy has purposefully “availed itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business” in the state.242  However, this 
analysis should give states and Etsy pause; personal nexus might not exist if 
the substantial nexus standard is allowed to advance past Wayfair’s vague 
expression.243 
Under the proposed substantial nexus standard,244 if the compliance 
costs of collecting the sales tax imposed on the marketplace rendered the 
marketplace’s activities in the state unprofitable, personal nexus would not 
exist (i.e. Etsy would not have availed itself of the substantial privilege of 
carrying on business in the state).  One challenge under the proposed standard 
would lie in determining the profitability of the marketplace’s facilitation of 
                                                        
 238.  See Shanske et al., supra note 15, at 112.  But see Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 15, at 
135 (“Nor is it clear whether a state may compel the marketplace facilitator to collect and remit use 
tax for its client, the remote seller.”). 
 239.  See About, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (describing the 
Etsy platform). 
 240.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-65-5 (2018). 
 241.  See supra Section I.A.1. 
 242.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 243.  Wayfair may have cut off the path to such advancement of the personal nexus standard 
when it indicated that some other aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause should address tax com-
pliance costs.  See id. (“The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Com-
merce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”).  Even if the path to advancing the personal nexus 
standard is cut off, substantial nexus doctrine can still align with theory through the development of 
the transactional nexus standard, which is the more important of the two aspects of the substantial 
nexus requirement.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See supra Part II.C.1 (developing the proposed substantial nexus standard, which can be 
stated formulaically as: Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus ⇔ Benefit to Taxpayer of Activity in 
State > Taxpayer Compliance Costs). 
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sales in the state.  The other challenge would be determining the compliance 
costs imposed on the marketplace by the taxing state. 
At first glance, it is not clear that any given marketplace would derive 
benefit from the taxing state simply by facilitating other vendors’ sales.  The 
analysis would first need to determine if the marketplace’s activities outside 
of the taxing state could be attributed to the state.  This analysis would likely 
depend on the arrangement between the marketplace and its vendors: what 
does the marketplace do for its vendors and what does it earn from each ven-
dor for those services, particularly with respect to the taxing state?  If the 
marketplace actively promotes its platform in the state and collects fees based 
on a per-transaction basis, this task may be relatively straightforward; if the 
marketplace is more passive or general fees are collected, then the task may 
become harder.  This analysis should be expected to separate active market-
places like Etsy from more passive ones like Craigslist.245 
Issues exist on the compliance costs side of the analysis as well.  There 
is an important difference between the vendor who is asked to collect taxes 
on their own sales and the marketplace that is asked to collect taxes on some-
one else’s sales.  The vendor has direct knowledge of the transaction, direct 
access to the information required to accurately collect taxes, and direct ac-
cess to the funds needed to pay the tax; the marketplace does not.246  The 
marketplace would have to retrieve that information from the individual ven-
dors and may have to pay the taxes out-of-pocket and seek redress through 
costly measures such as legal suits against vendors or customers.247 
                                                        
 245.  Craigslist does not engage in the same level of promotion of third-party sellers on its plat-
form as Etsy does. Compare Terms of Use, CRAIGSLIST, 
https://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use (last updated Aug. 16, 2019) (describing the 
Craigslist platform), with About, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (de-
scribing the Etsy platform). 
 246.  This is not to say that the marketplace could not easily acquire such information from the 
vendors, but in the first instance, the marketplace does not have that information and must incur 
some cost to retrieve it.  See infra notes 250–253 and accompanying text. 
 247.  For example, the South Dakota marketplace collection law treats the sales from the vendor 
as sales for resale, placing the burden on the marketplace to collect from the ultimate consumer.  S. 
2, 2018 Legis. Assemb., 93d Spec. Sess. (S.D. 2018).  A major source of compliance costs in the 
sales and use tax area is determining which sales are exempt from tax, which includes the collection 
and verification of exemption certificates from tax-exempt purchasers such as businesses that are 
not purchasing goods at retail.  See, e.g., Britt C. Dobbins & Wendy M. Leonard, Compliance Strat-
egies Regarding Resale and Other Sales Tax Exemption Certificates, 12  J. MULTISTATE TAX’N. & 
INCENTIVES 14, 17–23 (2003) (discussing common issues associated with exemption certificates); 
Dick Eppleman, Tax Practitioners and State Auditors Focus on Managing Sales Tax Exemption 
Certificate, 16 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N. & INCENTIVES 26, 29 (2007) (detailing compliance burdens 
associated with exemption certificates); Cara Griffith, Streamlining Versus “Amazon” Laws: The 
Remote Seller Dilemma, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 351, 354 (2010) (“Determining how to handle tax-
exempt sales, sales tax holidays, and product taxability coding can be a daunting task, particularly 
for small and midsize businesses.  It has been estimated that sales tax exemptions account for 60 
percent of the cost of compliance for small businesses.”).  As the tax collector becomes further 
removed from the purchaser, it may be more and more costly to obtain and verify those certificates. 
   
2019] NAVIGATING 21ST CENTURY TAX JURISDICTION 49 
The marketplace’s indirect connection to the transactions at issue is 
most concerning for the increased costs of addressing audit risks; the market-
place may need to rely on vendors for information necessary to comply with 
the state tax law, and vendor errors could increase the marketplace’s costs of 
interacting with a state taxing authority.248  By taking these costs into ac-
count, the personal nexus standard would reflect an understanding that the 
taxpayer’s connection to the activity taxed matters.249  In the case of the mar-
ketplace collection laws, collecting tax on other people’s sales may burden a 
marketplace too much, such that it forbids vendors from making sales into 
the taxing state using its platform.  However, where the state’s market is im-
portant enough to the marketplace, the compliance costs should not present a 
significant hurdle to South Dakota’s efforts. 
This observation highlights that the personal nexus inquiry need not im-
pose a high burden on states.250  Etsy could demand that its vendors transmit 
transaction information to Etsy in a reasonable manner.251  If all marketplaces 
did this, Etsy would not suffer market share because of the action and much 
of the harm might dissipate.  Sifting through many different vendors’ trans-
actions may be costlier than only dealing with one’s own sales, but the stat-
utory thresholds could be adjusted to account for this discrepancy. 
The important point is the personal nexus standard should take into ac-
count how the state tax system affects different taxpayers, bringing the stand-
ard closer in line with the traditional Pike balancing test and better fulfilling 
the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.252  The taxpayer’s con-
nection with the activity taxed is an important indicator of the burden of com-
pliance costs, and as that connection becomes weaker and less direct, the de-
mands of personal nexus should be expected to increase.253  The personal 
nexus of entities that facilitate the commerce of others, like marketplaces, 
payment intermediaries, and common carriers, necessitate a close look under 
the proposed standard. 
                                                        
 248.  See Holderness, supra note 17, at 334–39 (detailing the impact that the relationship be-
tween the taxpayer and the activity taxed can have on the burden placed on the taxpayer to collect 
taxes); see also Paul Jones, Etsy Releases List of States Where It Collects Sales Taxes, TAX 
ANALYSTS (Jan. 23, 2019) (“[Etsy] said collecting sales and use tax for multiple taxing jurisdictions 
using different rules is complicated and difficult, and urged sellers to support its effort to lobby 
lawmakers to back federal legislation that would standardize rules.  ‘Our experience [] [in Wash-
ington and Pennsylvania] . . . has shown us how hard it is to properly classify the 50 million hand-
made, craft, and vintage goods . . . into taxable item categories,’ Etsy said.” (third alteration in orig-
inal)). 
 249.  See Holderness, supra note 17, at 334–39 (arguing that even under the physical presence 
regime, the dormant Commerce Clause demanded some connection between the taxpayer and the 
activity taxed). 
 250.  See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 248 (detailing Etsy’s sales tax collection efforts). 
 252.  See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (discussing the Pike balancing test and 
the goals of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 253.  Cf. Holderness, supra note 17, at 334–39. 
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The above analysis highlights a second point about the proposed sub-
stantial nexus standard: transactional nexus is the prominent concern, not per-
sonal nexus.  In the above example, though the analysis is framed as devel-
oping the personal nexus standard, recognizing the importance of the 
relationship between the taxpayer and the activity taxed would wed the per-
sonal nexus standard to the transactional nexus standard.  When the compli-
ance costs imposed by the sales tax would cause the interstate sales activity 
to cease, transactional nexus with the taxing state should not exist.  And Etsy, 
as the taxpayer, should also lack personal nexus with the taxing state when 
those interstate sales would cease.  To be clear, Etsy would not have to stop 
interacting with the taxing state; it would just be protected from tax obliga-
tions until its activities were profitable enough to cover the tax compliance 
costs. 
Thus, a theoretically-sound substantial nexus standard could do away 
with the personal nexus inquiry,254 but given the prominence of the inquiry 
in the Wayfair case, courts are not primed to abandon the personal nexus as-
pect of the substantial nexus doctrine.  The above approach to personal nexus 
would at least bring the doctrine closer in line with theory but has the poten-
tial to fail to prevent undue burdens on interstate commerce when the tax-
payer has a large presence in the state unrelated to the activity taxed.255  For 
example, Washington State would likely find personal nexus with Seattle-
based Amazon.com for almost any kind of tax, regardless of the specific com-
pliance costs associated with the tax.  Some case law even indicates that a 
taxpayer’s nexus with a state need not be related to the transaction taxed by 
the state, though this case law appears to be grounded in the Due Process 
Clause rather than the dormant Commerce Clause.256  Thus, the above ap-
proach to personal nexus might not provide the appropriate protections 
                                                        
 254.  See supra note 200. 
 255.  Given historical practice and the lack of clear guidance from the Wayfair Court, courts 
should be expected to find personal nexus where the taxpayer has a high amount of activity in the 
taxing state, particularly where the taxpayer has a physical presence in the state.  Even the Wayfair 
Court was taken in by the amount of activity in the state, simply stating that such amount of activity 
met the substantial nexus standard without deeper explanation.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).  However, a prominent practitioner has suggested that a taxpayer 
could challenge a finding of substantial nexus based on its physical presence in the taxing state, 
arguing that after Wayfair, physical presence alone is not enough to establish personal nexus.  See 
Amy Hamilton, What Will the First Post-Wayfair Litigation Look Like?, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 609, 
609–10 (2018) (discussing comments of Leah Robinson). 
 256.  See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 561 (1977).  In 
determining that the taxpayer’s nexus did not depend on the activity taxed by the state, the National 
Geographic Society Court claimed that the test was “simply whether the facts demonstrate ‘some 
definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax’” 
and cited to the Miller Brothers case for support.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Miller Bros. 
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).  This language used by the Court parallels due process 
standards for nexus, not those of the dormant Commerce Clause, and Miller Brothers is best viewed 
as a due process case, as argued earlier.  See supra note 55; see also Holderness, supra note 17, at 
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against undue burdens on interstate commerce,257 but developing the trans-
actional nexus standard as described in the next Section can ensure those pro-
tections exist. 
B.  Ghosts of Transactional Nexus: The Ongoing Vitality of Sales and 
Use Tax Formalism 
As noted, the issue in Wayfair was personal nexus, but the South Dakota 
statute has a lurking transactional nexus issue.258  That issue results from the 
fact that the South Dakota statute only requires remote vendors to collect 
sales taxes; there is no obligation to collect use taxes.259  In fact, South Dakota 
doubled down on its disregard for this issue by passing a marketplace collec-
tion bill that also only applies to the collection of sales taxes.260  If South 
Dakota lacks transactional nexus with out-of-state sales—as the pre-Wayfair 
jurisprudence suggests that it does261—then any attempt to require vendors 
to collect those sales taxes should fail.  In contrast, it is clear under the juris-
prudence that South Dakota could require vendors to collect use taxes on the 
products that they sell into the state for use there, making the limited scope 
of the South Dakota statutes a seemingly incredible foot-fault for the state. 262  
States like South Dakota who impose only sales tax collection obligations on 
remote sellers have left themselves vulnerable to legal challenge.263 
If Wayfair is read to reject this transactional nexus formalism, then a 
transactional nexus challenge to a law like South Dakota’s would fail.  How-
ever, the Wayfair Court’s cavalier approach to the transactional nexus issue 
makes reliance on such a reading risky.  Even so, accepting that Wayfair did 
not directly dismantle the historical formalism created by transactional nexus 
doctrine does not require accepting that the decision did not provide the tools 
for dismantling that formalism in the future.  Should a remote vendor chal-
lenge a sales-tax-only collection regime, the courts would have to confront 
the transactional nexus issue head on. 
                                                        
334–38 (arguing that National Geographic Society is not controlling for dormant Commerce Clause 
purposes). 
 257.  See Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 15, at 291–92. 
 258.  See supra note 128. 
 259.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018). 
 260.  See S. 2, 2018 Legis. Assemb., 93d Spec. Sess. (S.D. 2018). 
 261.  See supra Section I.A.2. 
 262.  See Holderness & Boch, supra note 126.  Although there is an easy legislative fix to this 
problem—expanding the statutes to cover the collection of use taxes, the experience in South Da-
kota has shown that some states may be unaware of the gravity of the issue or unwilling to address 
it.  See Pomp, supra note 126. 
 263.  See Holderness & Boch, supra note 126. 
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Under current doctrine, the states would likely lose such a challenge of 
their efforts to tax out-of-state sales.264  However, Wayfair provides courts 
with the basis to explicitly abandon the formalistic distinction between sales 
taxes and use taxes by bringing the transactional nexus standard in line with 
the compliance burden theory.  Wayfair began this task in the personal nexus 
context, and that alignment should be continued in the transactional nexus 
context. 
A court approaching the transactional nexus issue should recognize 
Wayfair’s concern with compliance costs and establish that the compliance 
costs associated with the particular activity taxed cannot be allowed to cause 
the activity to cease in the state.  There is no place in this analysis for cate-
gorical declarations that transactional nexus does or does not exist with re-
spect to a particular form of taxation.265  Indeed, the Supreme Court has de-
manded that the substance rather than the form of a tax control its 
constitutionality; to determine the substance of a tax, the Court asks upon 
whom or what the tax is economically imposed.266  Although sales taxes and 
use taxes are formally imposed on separate transactions, they have largely 
been thought of as economically equivalent taxes on consumption.267 
Therefore, the only proper room for difference in the jurisdictional reach 
of sales taxes and use taxes (or any taxes) under the dormant Commerce 
Clause should result from differences in their compliance costs, as the pro-
posed standard recognizes.  Any concerns that loosening the transactional 
nexus standard would allow states to tax transactions beyond their borders 
are more appropriately addressed by due process protections against extra-
territoriality and the requirements of the apportionment prong of the Com-
plete Auto test rather than by the substantial nexus prong.268 
                                                        
 264.  See supra Section I.A.2.  McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co. prohibits a state from imposing a 
sales tax on sales consummated outside of the state.  322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). 
 265.  See supra notes 201–203 and accompanying text. 
 266.  See  Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (rejecting formalistic labels 
as controlling the constitutionality of a state tax and instead looking to economic realities of the 
tax); see also Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015) (“We see no 
reason why the distinction between gross receipts and net income should matter, particularly in light 
of the admonition that we must consider ‘not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its 
practical effect.’” (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279)); Walter Hellerstein et al., Commerce 
Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47, 49 (1995).  As Pro-
fessors Gamage and Heckman note, “[w]ho bears a tax or subsidy is a function of the relative price 
elasticities of supply and demand and is not fixed by who has a legal obligation to pay the tax.”  
Gamage & Heckman, supra note 17, at 486 n.18; see also Hellerstein et al, supra, at 54, 54 n.42. 
 267.  See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 17, at 347; McLure, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 9–16.  Because 
the use tax is often framed as merely a backstop to the sales tax, see POMP, supra note 70, at 6-39 
to 6-43, the substantial nexus jurisprudence before Wayfair had pushed use taxes into the shadow 
of sales taxes, and the transactional nexus standard for use taxes was not extended to sales taxes, 
which would have alleviated many of the formalism concerns in this area.  See Holderness, supra 
note 17, at 345–55 (tracing how use taxes were unnecessarily pushed into the shadow of sales taxes 
for nexus purposes). 
 268.  See supra notes 167–174 and accompanying text. 
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Breathing life into the transactional nexus standard as proposed would 
result in a theoretically-sound, substantial nexus standard regardless of what 
the courts do with the personal nexus doctrine.  The proposed standard would 
ensure the compliance costs associated with each tax are considered and 
would protect taxpayers from undue costs related to small amounts of inter-
state activity in a state. 
C.  Over 10,000 Taxing Jurisdictions: Substantial Local Nexus 
A final post-Wayfair issue to consider is whether substantial nexus will 
be required at the local level as well as the state level.269  Many localities 
impose their own taxes—Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Wayfair dissent 
that “[o]ver 10,000 jurisdictions levy sales taxes”270—and these local taxes 
conform to state-level taxes in varying degrees.271  Additionally, some local-
ities administer their own taxes, whereas others rely on the state to administer 
their taxes.272  Thus, a real possibility exists that a local-level tax could im-
pose significant additional compliance costs on an interstate taxpayer or ac-
tivity, such that the taxpayer might avoid conducting activities in the local-
ity.273  This result would seem to violate the demands of the compliance 
burden theory. 
However, localities come into existence differently than states.  The 
states are creations of the people and have divested some of their powers to 
the federal government including, as relevant here, the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce.274  Localities are creations of the states and often are 
viewed as mere extensions of the state.275  In other words, by creating a lo-
cality, the state merely decentralizes some of its operations in favor of various 
                                                        
 269.  See Joe Crosby et al., Wayfair: The Present and Future of State Taxes, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 
1073, 1076–77 (2018) (“[O]ne other question that follows on Wayfair is whether we will see local-
ities attempting to use Wayfair-like authority to reach outside their borders, even outside the state 
they’re in, and impose local business licensing or other types of imposition on companies that are 
making sales into the locality.”); Sarah Horn et al., One by One, Most States Responded to South 
Dakota v. Wayfair in 2018, RIA STATE & LOCAL TAX UPDATE, Dec. 12, 2018, at 4, 2018 WL 
6546893 (RIA) (discussing the confusion brought about as a result of the Wayfair decision, includ-
ing when a business must collect local taxes). 
 270.  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 271.  See POMP, supra note 70, at 6-44 to 6-46. 
 272.  See id. 
 273.  See Bland, supra note 227, at 623–24 (discussing concerns about the impact of a complex 
web of local taxes on Colorado’s efforts to implement a South Dakota-style nexus statute). 
 274.  See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 7–8 (8th ed. 2016). 
 275.  Id. at 8–9; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: The Structure of Local Government Law (pt.1), 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1990) (discussing the role of the local government in relation to the 
state). 
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goals.276  With the source of local power in mind, it becomes unclear whether 
local-level substantial nexus is needed once state-level substantial nexus ex-
ists. 
Although current substantial nexus doctrine does not provide a clear an-
swer to the issue, the problem is not as troubling as it might appear.  As a 
practical matter, the local-level substantial nexus question is currently trivial.  
The South Dakota model for statutory substantial nexus provisions—which 
most states have followed277—imposes thresholds designed to protect small 
vendors from being subject to the state’s tax obligations.278  As such, these 
thresholds likely do not come close to the constitutional line for substantial 
nexus; any person or activity exceeding the thresholds likely established con-
stitutional substantial nexus long before the thresholds were met.  This state-
ment may not be true in all instances, but on the assumption that the states 
will continue with the South Dakota model and not draw close to the consti-
tutional line for substantial nexus, it seems unlikely that the added compli-
ance burdens of local taxes would trigger constitutional concerns; the statutes 
will protect interstate commerce more than the dormant Commerce Clause. 
If the proposed substantial nexus standard is implemented, then the is-
sue of local-level substantial nexus becomes a non-issue.  The substantial 
nexus standard would permit those tax obligations that do not overwhelm the 
interstate commerce with compliance costs, such that the taxpayer would 
cease the activity in the taxing jurisdiction.  This standard necessitates a tax-
by-tax examination in order to determine whether the appropriate substantial 
nexus exists in each case. 
Therefore, a vendor asked to collect a local tax would have grounds to 
challenge that specific locality’s action if the tax’s compliance burden was 
too high.  Alternatively, and to the same practical effect, if one views the 
locality simply as an extension of the state, then the state would lack substan-
tial nexus with the taxpayer or activity when the local taxes increased the 
compliance burdens above the constitutional line.  Substantial nexus at the 
state level could be restored by eliminating the local tax in that instance or 
by reducing the differences between the state- and local-level taxes and the 
complexities those differences create.  In other words, if a state feels that its 
ability to impose taxes is impaired on substantial nexus grounds because of 
the complexity of local taxes, the state can rein in those local taxes. 
                                                        
 276.  BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 274, at 9–16; see also Yishai Blank, Localism in the 
New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 263, 270–77 (2006) (discussing various goals local-
ities are argued to achieve). 
 277.  See supra note 227. 
 278.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018) (imposing thresholds of $100,000 of gross revenue 
from sales into the state or 200 separate sales into the state before statutory personal nexus exists); 
see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (“[T]he Act applies a safe harbor 
to those who transact only limited business in South Dakota.”). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Wayfair decision brought the dormant Commerce Clause nexus 
doctrine into the twenty-first century and thus was one of the most impactful 
in the field of state and local taxation since the Quill case it partially over-
turned.  As a result of its abandonment of the historical physical presence rule 
for personal nexus, Wayfair might be read to have pushed the dormant Com-
merce Clause’s nexus requirement towards the Due Process Clause’s per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement.  Alternatively, the case could be read to have 
begun the work of establishing a nexus doctrine that more coherently ad-
dresses the concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
This Article has argued for the latter reading and continues the work of 
Wayfair by fully developing the compliance burden theory of dormant Com-
merce Clause nexus and the standard that follows from that theory.  The Ar-
ticle also has mapped out the path for incorporating this theoretically-sound 
nexus standard into the jurisprudence through future litigation spurred by un-
answered questions from Wayfair.  Ensuring the dormant Commerce Clause 
nexus doctrine continues to come into alignment with theory will prevent the 
protections of the doctrine from withering away and will ensure that interstate 
commerce—particularly that conducted by small businesses and online mar 
ketplaces—is not subjected to undue burdens from state tax compliance 
costs.  With a little help, Wayfair can be the beginning of the way forward 
for the dormant Commerce Clause nexus doctrine, not the end. 
